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Mohan Dutta (left) conducting fieldwork in a village in West Bengal, India, where he helped develop a community plan for building a cultural and livelihood resource centre celebrating the indigenous Santali culture. Dutta is the guest in this issue’s Interview. – Photo courtesy of Mohan Dutta.

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Whether it’s to understand students taking part in protests in Taiwan, future consumers of news in Indonesia, or identity formation in Singapore, the media habits of the young are major area of Asian communication research. In societies with high Internet penetration, the young have adopted new media enthusiastically, spending less time with traditional media such as newspapers, radio and television. The trend raises broader questions about whether these generational differences in media consumption will also mean differences in values and orientations.

Not surprisingly, all the data show that in cities across Asia, youths are more likely than older citizens to use the Internet. In China, those aged 10 to 29 years make up more than 40 percent of the total population of Internet users, according to 2013 figures from China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC).
Internet penetration of adolescents in Korea, Taiwan and Singapore had already reached 90 percent by the year 2001 (Jung et al., 2005). In 2012, 98 percent of 7–14-year-olds and 99 percent of 15–24-year-olds in Singapore reported having accessed the Internet in the previous year, according to the Infocomm Development Authority. The same study found that social networking is the primary Internet activity for these age groups. In many countries, mobile phones have overtaken desktop and laptop computers as the main doorway to the Internet, allowing youths to access the Internet throughout the day.

Recent studies on the implications of these trends include a 2014 volume edited by Lars Willnat and Annette Aw, *Social Media, Culture and Politics in Asia*, which includes survey results from nine Asian societies. In December 2014, Griffith University and the Monash Asia Institute in Australia hosted a conference, 'Interactive Futures: Young People’s Mediated Lives in the Asia Pacific and Beyond,' focusing on the impact that media practices have for citizenship, ethics, political and cultural agency, and social bonds. In China, the New Media Communication Association Annual Conferences have been tracking issues such as the influence of social media on the cognitive development and peer relationships of youths in the world’s largest population of Internet users.

**Political Participation**

One of the major issues being investigated is the relationship between young people’s Internet use and their political participation. Traditional mass media have been regarded as not very effective in promoting political interest among young people (Acar, 2008; Cohen 2008). The Internet is more likely to have an impact, some say (Mossberger, Tolbert & Stansbury 2003; Shah, Kwak & Holbert, 2001). The young may respond to youth-oriented political content that is enriched with interactive, visual-intensive, and game elements (Iyengar & Jackman, 2003). As for social media use, opinion is divided. Some argue that social media have a significant positive effect on participation, bolstering democracy (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012). Others are sceptical, pointing to the self-centred nature of much social media use (Groshek & Dimitrova, 2011; Fenton & Barassi, 2011).

Factors that modify the extent of participation have also been explored, such as social economic backgrounds, digital media skills (Best & Krueger, 2005), information use (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung & Valenzuela, 2012; Skoric & Poor, 2013) and active information seeking (Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010). The role of government is another important factor that influences the relationship of social media use and participation (Martin, 2013). In a study of Korean adolescents’ media use and political engagement, it was found that among four motivations (guidance,
surveillance, social utility, and entertainment), young people are more likely to engage in politics when they use new media to fulfil guidance and social utility needs (Kim & Kim, 2007).

One clear lesson that has emerged from these studies is the need to be more precise about the key terms, Internet use and political participation. The Internet can be used in very different ways, with different effects. Whether the Internet is being used to read online news or for social networking, for example, can have distinct implications for political participation (Martin, 2013). Social networking sites (SNS) themselves can be used in different ways, including for leisure and entertainment. Informational use of SNS for news has been found to have a positive association with both online and offline participation (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung & Valenzuela, 2012). Not surprisingly, online political media usage (frequent participation in political blogs, political Facebook groups and especially political discussion) is positively related with offline political participation (Willnat & Aw, 2014). That is to say, young Asians who use social media for political purposes tend to be politically more active online, even in countries where website content is seriously censored. This indicates that social media are an important political sphere for a small but highly active group of politically engaged students.

Just as there are diverse types of Internet use, there are many different kinds of political participation, with different implications for politics and democracy. Simply ‘liking’ a civil society group’s Facebook posting—the kind of participation that has been derisively termed ‘slacktivism’—needs to be distinguished from, say, responding to an online appeal to donate money or to show up physically at a demonstration. Young people in Singapore have been found to prefer more passive forms of political participation, such as watching political videos and visiting political websites, than actions that require personal initiative, such as posting comments on political websites, contacting politicians, and submitting political videos online (Hao, Wen & George, 2014). They are more likely to share content and ideas with friends and family than with policy-makers and the wider public, despite the fact that the Internet makes it technologically simple to reach these audiences. Another study found that young respondents are more likely to consider solitary activities, such as searching for political information or reading blog content, as political participation, raising questions about generational differences in how survey questions about political participation are interpreted (Weaver, Lariscy et al., 2011). Scholars have also argued that new types of online political participation should be treated as conceptually and operationally distinct from earlier forms. These include the widespread use of humour in political postings, wide-reaching
mobilisation campaigns, and politically motivated hacking (Chadwick, 2006; Raine & Smith, 2008; Schlozman, Verba & Brady, 2010; Vitak et al., 2011).

**Social Integration and Fragmentation**

Another major line of questioning considers the potential impact of the young’s Internet use on social integration. It has been observed that mass-circulation newspapers and free-to-air television channels provide a shared experience for a city’s inhabitants. They can be a common space for social conciliation and building a national identity. In contrast, the Internet is more fragmented. “The news landscape has definitely been balkanised by the emergence of multiple news providers,” says Lim Sun Sun of the National University of Singapore. “High levels of customisation within social media platforms would also further create more niche publics, and the effects of polarisation may also be amplified by the algorithms which are used by social media platforms to determine the visibility and variety of particular news stories.”

The positive side of this is that young people’s peer cultures or subcultures could be enhanced by the technology. Online communication platforms enable young people to extend their peer interaction beyond their face-to-face encounters with one another. Homosexual youths, for example, tend to seek advice about their sexuality from the Internet (Silberman, 2001). A similar finding was drawn from research on the media use of juvenile delinquents in Singapore, which found that a group of delinquent teens who were incarcerated for criminal activity, would ‘meet’ each other in an online chat group labelled ‘715’—the apartment building number—thus remotely sustaining their face-to-face peer culture even while physically absent (Lim, Basnyat, Chan, Vadrevu & Koh, 2011).

Around Asia, teen girls take camera phone photographs during outings with friends and share them on the spot via Bluetooth or Facebook for their friends to view and access. This has been studied in Singapore, where scholars say that this instantaneous capture and dissemination of peer encounters has allowed young people to...
construct shared memories that serve to enhance their sense of group identity (Lim & Ooi, 2011). Although online peer culture is situated within and shaped by offline culture, the dynamics of the online environment can influence the nature of peer interaction and alter the basis of peer culture. The nature of media subcultures is categorised as media-based and media-facilitated, for the two are not mutually exclusive (Lim, 2013).

Impact on Traditional Media Use
From the media industries’ perspective, one of the main questions is how the new digital natives’ media habits will affect the future of

**Attracting young readers**

The news publishers association, WAN-IFRA, says there are ways for newspapers to attract young readers. Here are some of its tips:

1. **Be there for the firsts.**
   Paying attention to the important moments in their lives help to engage the young. Among the 2013 World Young Reader Prize winners were projects helping secondary students learn how to perform in a job interview and giving a first lesson in what news would be like without press freedom, showing children how fun reading can be, providing vocational students with their first fame and letting university students determine the news. See www.wan-fra.org/worldyoungreaderprize.

2. **Free the zoo.**
   Young people are often relegated to what Knight Foundation innovation specialist Chris Sopher calls the ‘zoo’, with inclusion only when there is a designated ‘youth’ topic. Coverage about children tends to frame them as victims, and about teenagers as troublemakers. The youngest adults, between ages 18 and 25, are often absent. This year’s top editorial winner, Avisa Nordland, completely opened the doors to 60 younger readers to help reshape the editorial and business approach of that paper. See www.wan-ifra.org/newsliteracy.

3. **Give young people a chance to do it themselves.**
   Few strategies remain more powerful than giving a young person the chance to be a reporter, especially if it is for real. The *West Australian* turned over its columns to ‘Generation Z’ teenagers for a week in 2014. Other media and morning breakfast shows picked up on the event nationally, so it was very positive for the newspaper’s image.

4. **Pay more attention to young parents and to teachers.**
   News publishers can make themselves a trusted partner in the upbringing and quality education of a child. The *Philippine Daily Inquirer* showed its commitment to basic literacy by arranging 300 memorable and fun storybook readings by inspirational people in 52 cities over the last six years.

5. **Embrace media literacy—especially news literacy.**
   Newspapers can and need to lead in this field. This is partly to assure that the lessons include an understanding of professional journalism practice and an appreciation of the role of journalism in a democracy. For example, The Guardian News and Media Education Centre invites school classes to explore with staff about everything from story selection to ethics as they public their own newspapers. For more information, contact Aralynn McMane, Executive Director, Youth Engagement and News Literacy, WAN-IFRA (aralynn.mcmane@wan-ifra.org).
newspapers, radio and television. Studies have linked a decreased use of traditional media to the growing hold of the Internet (Dimmick et al., 2004; Lee & Kuo, 2002; Kayany & Yelsma, 2000). However, researchers are also exploring the possibility that the relationships are more complementary (Anderson, 2008; Tsao & Sibley, 2004; Lee et al., 2005). McClung et al. (2007) found that listening to the radio was positively associated with Internet use in general, but negatively associated with playing video games. Recent studies use the concept of Internet connectedness rather than Internet use, to capture the idea that the time spent with the Internet may not be exclusive and may actually drive other activities (Jones & Fox, 2009). In five East Asian cities, Jung, Lin and Kim (2012) identified three types of Internet connectedness: communication/entertainment, expression/participation and information/research. They revealed that adolescents in the five cities engaged in communication and entertainment activities the most, followed by information and research, and expression and participation related activities. Young people who watch TV for entertainment are also likely to use the Internet for the same function. The authors argue that among adolescents, television and the Internet can co-exist as major channels for entertainment and communication.

Media organisations are hoping to cultivate the next generation of news consumers. Every year, the news publishers association WAN-IFRA runs a Young Reader Summit, where news organisations share insights about their projects. In 2014, WAN-IFRA published a list of ten tips to help editorial teams attract young audiences (see box).

In Indonesia, where almost 40 percent of the population is under the age of 30 and social media has taken off, Young Reader Indonesia (YRI) promotes the reading culture. Newspaper company Jawa Pos started the DetEksi project, in which part-time college students publish a three-page daily youth section in the newspaper. In 2010, 51 percent of Jawa Pos readers were under the age of 30. In Hong Kong, South China Morning Post launched a weekday school edition.

**Future Directions**

Despite the large amount of work that has already been done, young people's media use remains an area that demands further research. Most early studies investigated the time spent with the Internet and other media. However, these fail to capture what exactly people are doing online. Lim Sun Sun asks, “Exactly how much socio-political news are young people really consuming, considering that the line between news, infotainment and other emerging media genres is increasingly blurry?” What we know about the impacts on participation and integration is similarly obscured by conceptual fuzziness.
as well as a shortage of empirical research. Scholars are divided over what to make of more novel kinds of online activity—whether they should count as meaningful forms of participation and social engagement, and how they will affect social and political dynamics.

Also lacking is research on how online environments affect youth culture, social identities and collective experiences. Being constantly connected to their peers through the Internet, will young people feel greater pressure to adhere to peer norms? If so, this may in turn shape their expectations, their identities, and their notions of citizenship. Finally, there is clearly no single ‘Asian’ or global experience. Comparisons across Asian countries could reveal interesting differences. For example, it is possible that in some Asian cultures, young people are more open with their opinions and feelings online and more reticent in face-to-face situations. Media habits also vary, with youths in Seoul, for example, much less likely to read newspapers than their counterparts in Hong Kong, Taipei, Singapore and Tokyo. In Japan, television is still ahead of social media as a news resource for the young. Explaining these differences are among the many questions to be answered about youths’ media use in the coming years.

References


The year 2015 marks the expiry of the Millennium Development Goals process. Not surprisingly, the goals have been only partially achieved at best, requiring a new round of target setting. In 2014, the United Nations General Assembly’s Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals proposed 17 goals and 169 associated targets. In December, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon released his Synthesis Report, proposing six essential elements for delivering the SDGs. In these various documents, the role of communication has merited some mention. The High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda called for five “transformative shifts”, including (4) “building peaceful societies as well as open, transparent, accountable governance”. The Secretary-General’s report noted that “press freedom and access to information, freedom of expression, assembly and association are enablers of sustainable development”. The term ‘participatory democracy’ also surfaces. However, many experts are not convinced that media and communication are being taken seriously enough in the post-2015 agenda. In the special section that follows, Media Asia invited a selection of academics, analysts and practitioners to comment.
Development and participation: Turning the tables

The dominant mode of development communication has been expert-led and top-down, treating disadvantaged communities as targets of interventions designed to alter the individual behaviour of their members. Mohan J. Dutta is among researchers who challenge the effectiveness of such strategies, pointing out that they often fail to address more structural impediments to social justice. As a radical alternative, Dutta has developed what he calls the culture-centred approach. He has run several community-based projects working with historically marginalised groups and has also become one of the world’s most prolific scholars in health communication. He shared his ideas with Media Asia editor Cherian George.

Cherian George:
The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) proposed for the post-2015 agenda don’t mention media or communication as explicitly as many in our field hoped. Does this surprise or disappoint you?

Mohan Dutta:
It’s disappointing, for sure. But it is no surprise, because I think that in many ways communication is taken for granted, at least in the way the broader structures—such as the UN within this context—conceive of development. Communication is not clearly articulated and it is therefore really problematic, because this also erases the basic processes by which these decisions and goals are arrived at, as well as the processes of accountability that are tied to them.

CG: Does that suggest that it is no accident that some of these issues are left out?

MD: Exactly. Let me give you an example. When you look at the SDGs, there is quite a bit of mention of participation all across. It talks about being participatory, and having many...
stakeholders at the table. This was also the case with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). But when I looked closely at the ways the agencies went about implementing, articulating or evaluating the MDGs, I could see that participation remained pretty abstract. Also, how participation is determined and conceived stays pretty much in the hands of the power structure. It feels the same way with the Sustainable Development Goals as well: communication concepts such as participation seem pretty empty.

CG: But would you say that there has been some progress, at least since the early days of the MDGs, in that the value of informed participation in government processes is now taken for granted? The big international and multi-lateral agencies now have processes by which people sector inputs are gathered, in a way that wasn’t the case, say, 20 years ago?

MD: In terms of the rhetoric, certainly there has been progress. My research is field-based research, working in very disenfranchised communities, and I find that the rhetoric certainly has moved, but how that has translated into opportunities for the very marginalised to actually participate—that remains the question. So, going back to your point, there is definitely a shift toward more participatory processes of decision-making. The real work that needs to be done is connecting that to what is actually happening on the ground.

CG: You have distinguished your own approach from what’s broadly called participatory development. The common feature between participatory development and what you call the culture-centred approach is a dissatisfaction with top-down approaches, and a desire to see more participation by local communities. But you take it a step further, as you want to ensure that the participation and the dialogue include more structural impediments, and not just what individuals can do to improve their lot.

MD: That’s beautifully put. Can I elucidate that with an example? Let’s take how participatory development is typically conceived of within the structures like the UN, the World Bank and the World Economic Forum. Take the issue of mining in the context of India. There are a large number of participatory projects that are run by NGOs, which often have funding that comes from the mining companies. They are termed participatory because they engage communities in stakeholder decision-making processes. On paper, all of this looks as if participation is what is taking place and decisions are being arrived at through participatory processes. You see this
happening across the eastern zone of India—Orissa, Chattisgarh, where there are large mineral deposits.

But what is actually happening is that participation becomes a strategy for co-opting, either in terms of forming very neutral-sounding projects like building a school or building water supplies, or more co-optive projects such as actually paying people off to say certain things at these so-called participatory meetings.

CG: So, what you have seen at the grassroots is evidence of processes that look good on paper being gamed, being colonised, by those with the resources to, for example, pay spokesmen.

MD: Exactly. I would go a step further and say that the language of participation is being used precisely to disenfranchise and marginalise those subaltern communities.

CG: Could you cite a concrete example that you have seen first-hand?

MD: Absolutely. Take the example of the protest of the Dongria Kondh tribal community in the Niyamgiri Hills in Orissa. A large British transnational mining corporation, Vedanta, was coming in to build bauxite mines bauxite distillery outfits. According to the Constitution of India, particularly the Panchayats Act of the Indian Constitution that protects tribal land, consultative participation was a key element that was already built in.

But when the company, working with the local government, carried out these participatory forums, it did a few things. For instance, the forums were held at sites quite far away from the actual communities where the Dongria Kondh reside. The announcement for the meetings was not distributed in the communities; rather, the announcement was published in the English-language newspapers that were circulated only in Bhubaneswar. The time between the announcement and the actual meeting was very short. The Dongria Kondh did not have prior knowledge about the meetings.

So here you have an example where communication is used precisely to disenfranchise a community. As a result, you didn’t really have the Dongria Kondh participating in the consultative meetings that were being held in far away spaces. Moreover, you have instances of community members who would talk about being bribed directly by the company or its CSR (corporate social responsibility) people, or being given various offers, such as being educated in a city, as ways to buy off or purchase participation.

CG: So your response is the culture-centred approach. Could you describe this?
MD: The culture-centred approach (CCA) argues for three things. First, participation of course is important and vital, but for participation to play an important role in listening to the voices of community, we need to think about the structures within which participation is situated. So, say, when I sit at the UN and set up a consultative forum, or when I am an NGO issuing a call for participation, that means something that is completely different from when, say, the Dongria Kondh organically come together to say that we don’t want this mining company in our community. This notion of the grassroots has to be understood in relation to the dominant structure.

The second point is, not only do we need to look at marginalised communities as participants in order to solve the problems that we think are important, but also we need to turn the table and create spaces for them to identify what the key problems are, and then to develop solutions to these problems. Often, we retain the language of theorising within our own elite clubs, as academics or as NGOs or as large organisations. What the CCA suggests is that we need to move the capacity of theorising into the hands of subaltern communities, and recognise that communities that are disenfranchised already have theories that they build to understand the problems that they face and to develop solutions to these problems. So the question is not even one of empowering, because the notion that I would come from outside and give them power also is arrogant. The notion rather is acknowledging the capacity of communities to participate in meaning-making. Every community, every human being, is capable of making meaning, and developing their own theories and sets of understandings.

The third point is the idea of reflexivity. It is one thing to say, let’s listen to these communities so we can solve these problems together; it is another thing to actually pay attention to what they’re saying and to be open to transformation. In my own work, at least, I try to use these opportunities of listening as ways of changing myself, my own biases, my privileges—as Gayatri Spivak would say, recognising our privileges as loss—and beginning from that space of humility. Part of this idea also then is that we will not always recognise our own
privileges and the limits to knowing. So the stance is always one of uncertainty and humility at the limits of knowing.

CG: You've applied this approach in a number of contexts and causes, in the United States, in India, and elsewhere. Could you give us an example that you think would illustrate the effectiveness of this method?

MD: Let's go to the context of Singapore. We have an ongoing project with the foreign domestic workers in Singapore. Now, this project with foreign domestic workers engages them, first and foremost in listening to their stories of struggle and the ways in which they understand their everyday lived experiences. We worked with them over the last two years, forming an advisory board of foreign domestic workers who were housed at HOME (Humanitarian Organization for Migration Economics). These are a small subsection of foreign domestic workers who end in some kind of trouble. For them, the problem, put broadly, was simple: they wanted to be treated as human beings and with respect when they worked in these households. That therefore became the basis for the campaign that they developed, called 'Respect our Rights,' in collaboration with HOME. The idea was that foreign domestic workers have rights. They have rights as human beings, but they also have rights as workers—which also shifts the notion of domestic work as being a space that needs to be recognised as a legitimate space of work.

CG: How does your approach differ from more conventional methods, which might include starting out with a focus group to find out what the real needs are, before a more systematic top-down campaign is tried?

MD: A traditional method will of course do a lot of formative research. They would go about doing focus groups, doing audience analyses, and maybe doing a survey to figure out the best way to segment the population, and then target the population. The CCA says that this entire way of segmentation and targeting—that still treats communities as a ‘target,’ as if they have to receive something that we have to give them—is fundamentally a paradigm that needs to be challenged.

When disenfranchised communities sit at the table rather than becoming targets, they become the decision makers. In terms of determining the agenda for strategies and tactics, in terms of setting up objectives and evaluating them, all of that pretty much is done by, in this case, the foreign domestic workers.

When the foreign domestic workers came together, they didn't design a campaign that said, now that we know what
are the problems faced by foreign domestic workers, let's figure out a way to educate them. That would be the traditional way in which we would go about running a campaign, at least in my understanding and training in communication. They said, instead, let's change the idea of who the audience is. For them, the audience became the everyday middle class and upper middle class Singaporeans and expats that hired foreign domestic workers in their homes. In that sense, it's the return of the gaze, if you will.

The target audience becomes someone with privilege. So the messaging, the segmentation and targeting was directed at this population that employed foreign domestic workers with the idea of generating empathy and shifting attitudes. So it's also a way of talking back to the structures.

CG: Whereas in conventional approaches such decisions in a sense would be prejudged, by the nature of organisation involved and so on?

MD: Right. It would be prejudged as therefore the content, the campaign's objectives, how it would be evaluated, would also be different. Traditionally, we would target those marginalised community as targets of our intervention, as opposed to targeting policy makers or people in the middle or upper middle classes.

CG: In the CCA, the role of the mediator is still central. You are not claiming that disadvantaged communities or subalterns are able to discover the entry-points into policy-making structures by themselves. There is still a role for experts like you to organise the conversation and so on. Is that correct?

MD: Yes. This is both theoretically and empirically a very powerful point. Because as researchers, we continue to retain our expertise in the process of conducting research. So part of the overall goal is to create relationships in these communities such that, over the long term, community members become the ones that take up the roles. Let me give you a couple of examples where that has happened. We have a project in the African American community in Gary, Indiana. There, we started a project on heart health, given that African Americans face tremendous disparities when it comes to health outcomes.
Now what has happened within that context is that the community organisers and the advisory board members within that community have started taking on those roles, identifying the issues and starting to find ways in which resources could be secured to address the issues.

We have similar examples in some Santali communities in West Bengal. They are able to come together and say, we want to work on these projects, we want to build this, and what are the kinds of things we need to do. The relationship of the researcher with these communities doesn’t really end. These are sustainable, long-term relationships. But in terms of the power sharing, much of the work that is being done is more and more in the hands of the community.

CG: So the expert researcher gradually becomes redundant as the community representatives learn how to navigate the corridors of power?

MD: Yes. Part of this process when I go in with my own privileges, is also recognising that these are privileges that one cannot wish away. These privileges are structured in power and in centuries of relationships between the middle and upper middle classes and the marginalised, especially when you take the context of India, where there is so much history of class, of caste. I don’t think that I can come in and somehow pretend that we are now equal, sitting at the table. So the process of learning, I also hope, also includes the community recognising, by working through me or through the researchers in these conversations, how the minds of these elites operate. They can use that knowledge strategically when needed in achieving their goals.

CG: Including learning the language of power and so on.

MD: Yes.

CG: Your own background and training, in an Indian Institute of Technology, followed by graduate study in the US, is as privileged and as elite as they come.

MD: Absolutely.

CG: So how did you personally get convinced about the capacity of the grassroots to articulate their own needs? Was there a particular eureka moment?

MD: I would say there are two parts two it. One part is stories of growing up. My father was a trade union organiser for the longest time. I’ve seen him working in villages and had an opportunity of spending time with him in the grassroots, and getting involved with it as I grew older, through street theatre and community theatre. Those sensibilities, I was lucky enough to have exposure to early on.
Having said that, I think my IIT education and then the education in the US—you would be amazed at how education sometimes works to put you out of touch with the lessons you might have learnt as a child! When I started working as a fresh PhD with many of these communities, running interventions on things like promoting safe drinking water and promoting immunisation, the part that was most humbling was recognising how ineffective I was as a researcher. That was a big threat to the sense of ego one builds up through grad school and thinking that we can solve some of these fundamental human problems.

I think that was a starting point, just realising how much the work I was doing was not really working, was not really making much difference. I remember working for a while on two projects, on family planning and safe drinking water. We did the work, did the formative research, ran some messages. And then the effect sizes were so small or almost negligible. The amazing part is that I never thought of talking to the community and asking them, did they think this way of framing the problem would work. It was only much later that, talking to community members, they said, you talk about family planning, but have you considered that having many children in our kinds of family setting is actually what helps us deal with poverty, and gives us more bodies to work on the field, or to earn some money so that the family can actually have more. So I was being introduced to alternative logics that I had no idea about—but even saying that, I kind of feel ashamed, because if I had paid attention to what I had learnt early on in life, I should have known. But I forgot those things.

CG: Maybe it’s only on hindsight that one’s biography make sense in the form of a smooth narrative. In the moment, you tend to forget where you come from, the lessons of childhood.

MD: Exactly. It was the same with my education at IIT, where I was trained as an agricultural engineer. I was trained on all these stories about the effectiveness of biotechnology and the green revolution, and believing that that kind of technological determinism would solve problems of poverty or problems of hunger—again, not realising how removed that was from the everyday experience of farming, or the long history of

I would certainly spend time to write it up for an academic journal... but really the impact of this work is in going back to these communities.
indigenous knowledge in farming and agriculture that exists in the life system of India.

CG: Staying on this more personal plane, the outlets for your intellectual work are more diverse than the average scholar. You are involved in theatre for social change, for example. You are a dancer, a choreographer. It fits the profile of the Renaissance Man, but I don’t want to call you that because it may be too Western a label! How would you characterise what by modern standards is a very odd compilation of interests and skills?

MD: I want to thank you for making this observation. The reason I came to communication from agriculture is because I felt that I didn’t have the answers that I was seeking. And of course it’s the same way with the study of communication—you don’t have all the answers that you seek. Working with various platforms, various kinds of media and various forms of expression—that’s really how I would put—is about finding many outlets for seeking answers within the important questions of social justice and social change. It’s a humbling moment when one recognises that any of this on its own is pretty incomplete or pretty fragmented.

When I think about what I do in the field: I would certainly come back and spend time to write it up for an academic journal. But I find that to be increasingly non-gratifying. Even though that’s an impactful way for sharing one’s work and it needs to happen, but really the impact of this work is in going back to these communities. We are experimenting with a project right now with folk media such as puppetry. So really, finding whatever kinds of communication and expression will work within a particular context and make an impact.

CG: This way of thinking about the scholarly life seems to fit well with the idea of the culture-centred approach, since the CCA depends on a sensitivity to different ways of knowing, a respect for different standards of evidence and argumentation and so on. So, being in touch with the aesthetic and emotional, as well as the hyper rational, might be part of the necessary training for a good researcher in this field.

MD: I think so. It is about recognising how small we all are. That’s a great moment, because it is also the recognition of all the learning that one needs to go through. It is a life long journey. So working with theatre activists, for instance, is a great way of learning techniques and processes and ways of thought and ways of expression that I otherwise I am not trained to work in. In that sense, one is always a student. It is a personal journey that is very fulfilling as a human being.
CG: Do you demand that your PhD student and post-docs are similarly rounded in their development? Or are you basically a slave driver telling them to focus on their dissertations?

MD: We have to try to negotiate both of these! On the one hand, my students and post-docs need to find jobs and need to be employed. Just as with me, I haven't given up academic publishing and gone all the way into the field, although sometimes I feel the pull, as that's what I want to do. I also need to make a living. So I think it would be unethical of me to demand that of them. But at the same time I try to at least converse with them about the value of the journey with the field, and the notion that one needs to go back into the community, that one needs to be committed to making a difference in the community.

We take stories from these communities, and then what do we do with these stories? If we are simply going to take the stories and write them up in journals, that can be seen as unethical from the worldview of the community. That's why many communities who are very marginalised and who have been over-researched are suspicious of researchers. So if someone says to you, I am in the midst of this struggle, how are we going to take the next step and try to address it? Which, of course, for a PhD student or a post-doc, is a lot to demand out of them, because that means they have to have an activist orientation and spend a substantial amount of time doing that kind of activism. So I recognise that this kind of model is maybe not sustainable for, say, a PhD who comes to work with me thinking that after they are done in three or four years, they need this number of publications that will get them a decent job in a tier one research institution.

CG: So it's possibly something that needs to be done later in one's career, or perhaps more collaboratively.

MD: Yes.

CG: Going back to this notion of radicalising the grassroots. You say that if we open up the dialogue, we will create a space to contemplate structural inequalities and produce social change. Now it's obvious to me that if we create a more open and equal dialogue, there will be a more authentic discourse. But my question is whether this more authentic grassroots voice is always a radically democratic voice. I mean, isn't it sometimes the case that the marginalised want solutions that preserve the status quo? Perhaps because of tradition, or because of the very practical reason that it is better to get palliative aid today than structural change over the long term? Have you encountered such resistance from the grassroots to your own recipes for resistance and social change?
MD: What a great point. The objectives as well as the desires of the grassroots can vary dramatically. So in, say, a community in rural Bengal, it may be a matter of building a village playground or a community centre, and that’s what they think is the way to improve their health. You go from something like that to projects where the community comes together saying, let’s build a community clinic or a community hospital, and part of structural awareness may be realising that the state mandates the delivery of decent healthcare for the poor, and doing activist work to make sure that that becomes available: filing right to information requests, signing petitions and giving them to local and state bodies.

Then, there is the other kind of resistance, as in the example of Dongria Kondh. That’s where the role of the CCA researcher is much more limited, where a community is so organised against what they see as structural violence that they take to activism and mobilisation. It becomes much more like a social movement. One’s role as a researcher then is simply in documenting the work and supporting the community in the resistance activities that follow, be it through direct action or legal and juridical processes. So there are a range of CCA projects.

CG: Have you ever been disappointed by the lack of radical sensibility on the ground? Have you been tempted to dismiss it as false consciousness and wish they would wake up to their true plight?

MD: The CCA sensibility is to recognise that every community has its own sense of meaning-making and understanding, and even within the most status-quo kind of solution, one sees possibilities of structural transformation. When we say it is a subaltern community, I mean, what is really a community? What you find is that a community is not a monolithic thing, and a community is not always ‘pure’. As you rightly point out, communities can, might, do have traditional agendas; communities have existing power structures within them. There are community settings where only men participate. One ought to ask, what happens to the voices of women and the participatory opportunities for the women? I think those are the kinds of things one consistently needs to work through.

Having said that, this idea of recognising the structures, being able to identify them, being able to talk about them in transformative ways—you see that in the life world of many communities. So the question is, are we really listening to recognise these forms of speech and these forms of articulation. James Scott talks about the various micro practices of
resistance. It is amazing, when you really start attending to these micro practices of resistance within communities and the ways in which they are not only working through the structures but also challenging them, resisting them, and in other instances seeking to transform them.

CG: Your work has received substantial funding from various reputable agencies. There’s a paradox there, because you do not shy away from accusing the neoliberal status quo for the inequalities that surround us. It’s a highly critical approach. And yet you are well funded by the status quo. How is that possible? How are you able to get such support?

MD: The National Institutes of Health and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality in the US, which takes as an agenda addressing health disparities—that is a different kind of entity in my mind, as opposed to, say, a foundation like the Clinton Foundation, Gates Foundation, or the Global Fund. In the same way, taking funding from the National University of Singapore or the Ministry of Education in Singapore has different meaning than taking funding from, say, Vedanta (a mining corporation) or a ministry of defence. Having said that, I’m very aware that the entire structure of funding impacts the agenda of the work you are doing, as well as the structure, the fabric, the nuance of the work. As a result, when one is working with a national institute of health on a project, one has to be sensitive to this idea that you are going to gather certain kinds of data in order to complete a report that meets the goals of that particular funding agency.

So that tension is always there, but that tension is similar to what one has to negotiate as an academic, trying to publish his work in journals. As a CCA scholar, I need to really look carefully at the organisation I’m drawing funding from. The World Bank, for example, has a number of projects on participatory development and participatory communication. At an ideological level, I don’t see how a CCA project can work within the purview of a World Bank funded project, because it will fundamentally be antithetical to the way in which you would go about doing a CCA project. One would have to think about the outcomes, the objectives, and are we really listening to the community. That kind of reflexivity would have to be there.

I do recognise that a structure like the Bank or the UN is powerful, and if one is really trying to have an impact at the policy level and create spaces for these voices within policy platforms, one has to engage that discourse. So if there opportunities for shaping the Bank discourse, the WHO discourse
or the World Economic Forum discourse, I would entertain that as a dialogic possibility. That notion of reflexivity is really important when thinking through these relationships. And one also needs to consider the ways in which he or she is being co-opted. For this critical reviewer of evaluation, I find it useful to draw from networks of solidarity, with friends, colleagues, activists, and community members holding me accountable, asking the tough questions.

In terms of the everyday practice of research and how I am able to do that, I think I speak in two languages—speaking in the language of the community, bringing forth these ideas, but also speaking in the language of these funding agencies and these structures. I think that’s why I am able to even publish some of this work in outlets that one may think would not be open to these kinds of argument. Take a journal like Communication Theory. For our field, that’s a space that needs to be engaged in dialogue, because that’s where your campaign planners and your theorists who are doing development communication work are going to come. I don’t think it’s meaningful to walk away from that. To do so, I have to speak two languages and I think I do that in my work.

CG: Your experience is encouraging because it contradicts that the cynical view that radical work would never be supported by establishment agencies or journals. There may be ways to have your cake and eat it too. I suppose it depends on self-critique and reflexivity to make sure you are not consumed by the values of these larger structures.

MD: Yes. I should also add that I’m heading a department of communication, and when I was at Purdue I was an associate dean for research. So even in these roles one gets to play out particular ways of evaluating knowledge. It’s a constant tension that I negotiate: how can I be critiquing neoliberalism and neoliberalisation of academia and then turning around and talking about impact factors and journal articles and these metrics, which in some ways might not make a whole of sense in the worldview I’m wanting to engage with.

CG: Going back to the post-2015 agenda. I wonder if your approach is ultimately more at home in the margins, and if it would be transformed beyond the recognition and lose its radical edge if you actually succeeded in being embraced by the mainstream?

MD: Let me share a couple of examples to engage with this question. Recently, I was invited to the World Economic Forum to share this idea of the culture-centred approach. There was quite a bit of dialogue and openness. I’ve also been invited to
the World Health Organization to talk about the cultural determinants of health in shaping the WHO agenda on culture. The question that you ask is exactly the question I personally grapple with, and that anyone who wants to work with the culture-centred approach ought to be grappling with, which is, is this kind of work better off at the margins, or does it need to sit at the table within these structures as these structures are seeking to adopt them to achieve their own ends?

A great example of this is Amartya Sen’s work on capabilities. It’s really amazing, inspiring and brilliant scholarship on capabilities, in which he shows us, for instance, that hunger is a problem of social distribution. But the notion of capabilities when it gets incorporated into the Millennium Development Goals really becomes a part of the neoliberal agenda. In the same way, then, the culture-centred approach has to consider the possibility that, as it engages with these dominant structures, it gets co-opted within these structures. So it has to come back to the reflexive stance to see how it keeps alive its resistant messages. I’ve in many instances found that these kinds of structures might be very open to the performance of this work as critical and radical—almost to the point where it seems like this kind of critical and radical angle offers an anchor to this whole multicultural, diverse narrative that they want to construct. In that kind of scenario, one needs to work hard to try to be aware of what the agendas are—and also how these agendas can be co-opted the other way round, to serve the needs of the marginalised and the disenfranchised.
Farmers sharing best practices through their own videos

Many ongoing projects use communication tools to accelerate the diffusion of sustainable development techniques. RIKIN GANDHI describes one such effort.

Sushila Devi, a mother of three, is a smallholder farmer from Itaha village, Muzaffarpur district in the Indian state of Bihar. With her spouse employed in a low-paying job in a different state, Sushila had no financial help or any land of her own to raise her family. In 2010, Sunita got in touch with Bihar Rural Livelihoods Promotion Society (also known as JEEViKA) and began farming on leased land. As a member of the Saraswati Self-Help Group, Sushila has been regularly attending video screenings on local best practices, videos that members of her community have produced and also helped disseminate. Sushila practises the farming techniques promoted through the videos, such as making and using *ghanjeevamrit* (liquid manure fertiliser). Sushila feels that although these techniques require more effort than traditional farming methods, her expenditure on seeds and pesticides has reduced greatly. She cultivates okra (*bhindi*), corn, and rice, selling the produce in the local market and earning INR 2,000 to INR 2,500 per month. Today, Sushila has saved enough to repay the loan on her farm, keep her kids in school, and own a one-room house. She continues to learn about localised sustainable innovations through videos and remains hopeful for her family’s future.

Stories like Sushila Devi’s affirm the relevance of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which will help inform the post-2015 development roadmap. Sustainable development is that which “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”, according to the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, commonly known as Brundtland Report. The needs of the marginalised and their “legitimate aspirations for an improved quality of life”, as the 1987 report put it, are at the core of the SDGs. Communication is key for these needs and aspirations to be met, especially communication that actually listens and gives voice to a community.

The videos that contributed to Sushila Devi’s changed fortunes are outcomes of a unique community-led learning approach led by
Digital Green, the organisation I lead. These videos are by, of and for the community, made in collaboration with local organisations. This localised ‘bottom-up’ content production and dissemination approach is seamlessly integrated with existing development efforts, and has proven to be more efficient and cost-effective than traditional approaches in ensuring uptake of agricultural and health best practices among rural communities. Smallholder farmers with limited or no resources for better livelihoods, a segment often ignored by program and policymakers, are immersed in this approach as both knowledge creators and consumers.

**Bridging the Information Divide**

In India and other developing countries, improved agricultural, nutrition and health indicators depend largely on communities adopting locally-relevant, evidence-based practices. However, access to timely and relevant information continues to be a challenge for most of these small-scale farmers due to limited outreach by extension systems and dated broadcast content. Private investment in these countries also tends to favour large, mechanised farms, overlooking the need to diffuse cost-effective innovations. Digital Green fills the information gap by combining a participatory engagement process, producing and screening localised educational videos. Village-level mediators—trained by our organisation, our partner non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and government agencies that already work with rural communities—produce and disseminate videos on locally relevant agronomic and livelihood practices to motivate and educate community members. To date, our network of partners and communities has produced nearly 4,000 videos in 28 different languages. These eight- to twelve-minute videos are screened on a weekly basis among small groups of farmers, mostly women’s self-help groups, using portable, battery-operated projectors that are durable, easy to use and adaptable to different environments.

The videos are localised in terms of topic, content, actors and language. The topics cover issues ranging from savings and credit programs to agronomic practices, aggregation and market linkages. A facilitator, selected from the community and trained by our organisation and partner NGO or government agency, mediates a discussion at the video screening. The first questions that farmers often ask when they see these videos are, “What is the name of the farmer in
the video?” and “Which village is he or she from?”

Some farmers will adopt practices just so that they are perceived within their communities as role models. The communities observe every detail keenly—even showing a plastic bucket in a video can raise questions about the bucket’s price and where it can be bought, which intermediaries from the community can help follow up on. We track adoption of the recommended practices and behaviours through regular verification visits. The screenings and the verification visits also serve as valuable sources of community feedback that informs further iterations of videos and their distribution. A controlled evaluation found this approach to be at least 10 times more cost effective (on a cost-per-adoption basis) and seven times more likely to result in farmers adopting new practices, compared with traditional extension efforts.

Scaling up
Digital Green began as a project at Microsoft Research India in 2006, and spun off as an independent non-profit organisation in 2008. We have since expanded our approach to reach over 6,000 villages and over 450,000 households in India, Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, and Mozambique. This participatory approach to social communication is malleable enough to be used across multiple domains. We are also structuring the videos into open online-offline courses that can train and certify rural community members as community knowledge workers.

A critical part of our journey thus far has been partnering with the right folks. Our partners are handpicked for their exceptional rapport with communities and proven experience in implementing sustainable development interventions. Our partners pave the way for us to mobilise community groups, nurture trainers within their network, and develop and disseminate localised knowledge products like videos. Through our approach, we have tried to combine cost-effective and user-friendly technology with social organisation to create a unique communication platform that sustains itself beyond the framework of any one intervention.

Physical infrastructure, political institutions and finance are necessary for this approach to succeed. The critical factor is human capital and effective partnership with government, NGOs, and private sector agencies that are deeply rooted within rural communities. That’s when videos can become the voice of the unheard—voices that herald sustainable change for the communities that produce them.

FURTHER READING
**Why words like participation may lose their magic**

*Everyone seems to agree that accountability, transparency, participation and inclusion matter for sustainable development, but behind this apparent consensus lie deep differences about what these terms actually mean,* warn **THOMAS CAROTHERS** and **SASKIA BRECHENMACHER**.

As the long process of reaching agreement on the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) moves into its final phase, the question remains open of whether or how these goals will incorporate a focus on governance. The most likely path to a solution of what has proven to be a surprisingly divisive issue is to include in the goals some of the key concepts that have come to be associated with international governance aid in recent years—above all, accountability, transparency, participation and inclusion. These four concepts—which share a common emphasis on the relational rather than technical dimension of governance—have been embraced, at least rhetorically, by a strikingly wide range of national and international actors. They have become ubiquitous in the policy statements of almost all different parts of the aid community, seemingly taking on the status of magic words of development. They appeal both as unquestionably good things in and of themselves—basic ways of respecting human dignity and individual autonomy—and as crucial levers for developmental progress. It seems common sense that accountable and transparent state institutions that allow genuine citizen participation and inclusion will perform better than institutions shut off from the societies they are meant to serve.

Yet drafters of the sustainable development goals who hope that relying on these principles will solve the conundrum of how to get agreement on the place of governance in the SDGs should be aware that behind the screen of near-universal consensus on these four principles lie numerous doubts and disagreements, both between aid providers and recipients as well as among aid providers themselves.

The four magic words serve as a bridge among the different aid sub-communities centred on governance, democracy and human rights, who each find in these concepts elements that overlap with their respective agendas. But the bridge is only partial. In practice,
practitioners in these sub-communities maintain very different understandings of and approaches to the four principles. Governance specialists, for example, tend to view them as tools to improve service delivery and institutional efficiency. Democracy and human rights practitioners, in contrast, see them as standards for renegotiating the basic rules of politics in developing countries.

On a broader level, disagreements persist over the intrinsic case for incorporating principles such as transparency, accountability, participation and inclusion into the international development agenda. Enthusiasts view them as valuable priorities in and of themselves, regardless of whether they produce better socioeconomic outcomes. But many aid practitioners worry that pursuing these principles risks diluting a core focus on poverty reduction or fighting disease and hunger, dragging donors into a normative terrain far removed from their core mandate.

Divisions also surround the instrumental case for the four principles. The empirical evidence regarding their effect on socioeconomic outcomes remains limited and inconclusive to date. Moreover, the impact of donor interventions related to accountability, transparency, participation and inclusion is often long-term, indirect and difficult to isolate from other factors. Existing evidence, while not necessarily generalisable, points to the need for a strong dose of realism and caution regarding donor expectations of developmental impact.

This uncertainty about the instrumental value of the four principles is compounded by the larger continuing debate over the relationship between governance and economic development. While some researchers argue that open, participatory and inclusive institutions closely correlate with economic success, another prominent school of thought de-emphasises the importance of Western-style governance. Scholars in this latter camp stress the crucial role of state capacity to intervene in the economy as well as the potentially beneficial role of neo-patrimonial governance structures in accelerating economic growth.

Moreover, formal agreement on governance principles and goals does not necessarily translate into sustained commitment to their application in practice. Despite harking to powerful notions of citizen empowerment, donor programs that invoke accountability, participation and inclusion too often amount to little more than formalistic exercises in popular consultation. Aid organisations frequently include appealing references to the four concepts in their programs without specifying the precise steps by which the desired change is to be achieved. As a result they fail to seriously challenge structural inequities in the distribution of power.
On the recipient side, while many developing country officials cite accountability, transparency, participation and inclusion as desirable principles for the international aid domain, their understanding of these terms tends to differ from donor approaches. They often welcome them as useful imperatives that should apply to the overall aid process, which they view as being too donor-driven and lacking accountability. In contrast, donors tend to invoke the very same terms as hoped-for characteristics of developing country governance. In other words, recipient governments embrace these principles as things they hope donor governments will do, while donors embrace them as things they hope recipient governments will do.

In short, appealing as they are and significant as they can be for development work, the four magic words are better understood as starting points rather than endpoints in the important search for agreement on the role of governance in development aid, in the SDGs and more generally. Partial or full inclusion of these principles in the Sustainable Development Goals will be a sign of progress—but only incipient progress at best.
Transparency and accountability in the post-2015 development agenda

DORA ALMASSY shares results from an Asia-Europe research project and highlights key gaps such as public access to government data.

As part of the effort to define a new global development agenda for the post-2015 era, member states of the United Nations (UN) have embarked on a process to identify a strong set of universally applicable sustainable development goals (SDGs) and targets that promote focused and coherent action on sustainable development. Recognising the need to support the implementation of these agreements, the 51 Asian and European heads of states and governments of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) decided to support the Sustainable Development Goals Creation in ASEM Countries via a research project through the Asia-Europe Environment Forum (ENVforum). The three-year research project aims to:

1. Develop and test a methodology in selected Asia-Pacific and European countries to identify a system of SDGs, and to provide guidance for the methodology’s broader application on global and national levels.
2. Identify illustrative SDGs and underlying targets and indicators that are guided by global considerations and informed by national priorities as expressed in existing national Sustainable Development (SD) Strategies and National Development Plans.
3. Provide countries in Asia-Pacific and Europe a foundation for developing their own SDG and indicator sets by producing national thematic templates that reflect their respective priorities, goals, targets and indicators.
4. Support the implementation of SDGs by providing guidance regarding their integration into policies and programmes.

This article summarises results of Part I and Part II of the research and via an illustrative example, highlights the importance of monitoring and accountability of the SDGs in post-2015 development agenda.
An illustrative Set of SDGs

Part I of the research was undertaken in a ‘Small Planet’: in 14 selected countries from Asia and Europe, namely Australia, Bangladesh, China, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Poland, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sweden and Switzerland. The Small Planet Initiative developed and adopted a unique methodology connecting global and national perspectives through an iterative process in order to identify an illustrative set of SDGs. This dual-level approach ensured that the SDGs have universal relevance and meet global criteria for sustainability, while being grounded in national SD priorities, goals and targets. The study also adopted a conceptual framework that linked the means (natural capital and economic processes) and ends (human well-being) of development, which ensured that all key dimensions of sustainability (socioeconomic development, environmental sustainability and governance) would be covered by the goals and sub-goals in a logical ordering. The project identified 11 priority themes with corresponding illustrative goal statements and 41 sub-goal statements. The 11th (or +1) goal, Adaptive Governance and Means of Implementation, was also recognised as being strongly linked to all 10 other goals. In addition to the 11 goals, a small number of crosscutting issues (gender, peace and security) were identified.

In addition to the aforementioned set of goals, several lessons have emerged from the project that may inform and support the development of SDGs on both global and national levels.

**Figure 1**
The alignment of the 10+1 Small Planet goals with the ultimate means-ends framework
• While SDG development is a new challenge, it can and should build on existing experience in goal setting, monitoring and implementation. Since the goals have to be both universally applicable and nationally acceptable and relevant, goal setting should follow an iterative multi-step process that must be carefully planned.

• The adoption of a conceptual framework that captures sustainability issues in a structured way and as an interconnected system is imperative for making sure all key sustainability priorities are considered, logically linked and structured.

• Governance is a key but insufficiently understood and represented aspect of SD that national SDGs must clearly cover. To ensure that goals actually provide overall direction for sustainable development governance, the SDGs must fit into and be accompanied by other elements of a sustainable development governance and management framework. The broader governance framework includes strategies, plans and implementation mechanisms with which SDGs must be closely linked.

• Besides a clear statement of goals, these other elements include targets that express the goal in quantitative terms and indicators that are essential for measuring and evaluating progress. Effective tracking and clear communication of progress towards SDGs will be important.

Monitoring Progress
To develop a matching set of sustainable development indicators (SDIs) for the illustrative goals, Part II of the Small Planet Initiative sought to identify indicators for 11 illustrative goals and sub-goals based on research in 14 Asian and European countries. Indicator selection was based on an extensive review of existing indicators in the 14 countries, with global considerations and research efforts also taken into account where country experience was insufficient. In most cases, three indicators were identified for each sub-goal. Where applicable, the indicators were chosen to cover the social, economic and environmental dimensions of SD. In all cases, indicator selection was informed by higher-level principles related to sustainable development measurement and assessment, such as BellagioSTAMP (IISD 2014) and relevant selection criteria such as robustness of the measurement methodology and data availability. While data availability was an important criterion, indicator selection was not data-driven; it was driven primarily by the underlying substantive issue of any given goal and target.

The indicators attached to the 11 Small Planet goals show how countries can make use of their existing monitoring and statistical data collection systems when selecting indicators for SDGs relevant to their national priorities. Focusing on existing systems can also
help identify areas where existing information and capacities need to be strengthened. Although the focus of the study was the ASEM member countries, the process and resulting indicators also contribute to the global SDG process and can guide other countries as they begin to contemplate the implementation of SDGs relevant to them.

**Transparency and Accountability**

One of the important sub-themes that have emerged under the +1 ‘Adaptive Governance and Means of Implementation priority theme’ of the Small Planet goals highlighted the need for improved transparency and accountability in the post-2015 development agenda. Accordingly, as also suggested by the UN High Level Panel target 10.d, sub-goal 11.4 was introduced to ensure that “progress towards the SDGs is tracked and the relevant information is accessible to all and reviewed on a regular basis”.

Sub-goal 11.4 of the Small Planet goals encompassed notions of monitoring, evaluation, reporting and performance reviews as an important part of the policy management cycle. Despite the obvious importance of this topic, relatively fewer detailed goals, targets and indicators were identified in the reviewed Small Planet countries. In some countries (e.g. Australia), approaches for reporting from a sectoral perspective were identified as governance goals, while others included the private sector’s responsibility to report on their performance (e.g. France). Moreover, relatively few relevant indicators were identified in the Small Planet countries, and most of these were related to specific issues, i.e. progress monitoring of water or biodiversity issues. Identified indicators mainly monitored the implementation of physical observatories, development of databases, inventories or impact assessments, and focused less on cross-cutting sustainable development issues.

To promote the public’s right to information and access to government data, the Small Planet initiative selected five indicators for measuring progress towards sub-goal 11.4 of its illustrative set of goals. Firstly, two components of the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ‘Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in the Public Sector Index’ are suggested as two of these indicators. These concern the ‘accountability of the executive and other top officials to effective oversight of institutions’ and the ‘access of civil society to timely and reliable information on public affairs and public policies, including fiscal information.’ In addition, the Development Data Group maintains a bulletin board on statistical capacity, which

*Increased media attention can promote better access to statistical data on public affairs.*
measures the monitoring capacity of national statistical systems in developing countries. Lastly, the Small Planet Initiative also suggested two additional global-level indicators to be developed and monitored for improved monitoring and transparency of the SDG implementation process. These are the number of countries whose statistical offices have adopted an SEEA framework, and the number of countries that have a functioning monitoring system for SDG indicators.

To conclude, mechanisms for reporting progress towards sustainability objectives seem to be strong candidates in the post-2015 development framework. However, the monitoring and reporting of the SDGs will be a complex process that will also require the involvement of various stakeholders from the civil society. To this latter end, representatives of the media will also have an important role in ensuring better monitoring and reporting of the SDGs. This is due to the fact that increased media attention can, for instance, promote better access to statistical data on public affairs and improve the accountability of governments and companies. In addition, the media can also contribute to more up-to-date data collection and analysis of development issues, e.g. via social media tools. Lastly, the media, especially data journalism, will have a crucial role to play in the envisaged data revolution in the post-2015 development agenda, where data on development issues will be widely available, accessible and explained to the public.

### References


### Table 1

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<td><strong>Suggested indicators / indices</strong></td>
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<td>Accountability of the executive, and other top officials, to effective oversight of institutions</td>
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<td>Access of civil society to timely and reliable information on public affairs and public policies, including fiscal information</td>
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<td>Statistical Capacity Index</td>
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<td>Number of countries whose statistical offices adopted and implemented the SEEA framework</td>
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<td>Number of countries that have a functioning SDGI tracking and reporting system</td>
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Independent media are needed to track progress towards SDGs

*The media must have both the freedom and the responsibility to monitor development activities, says DAMAKANT JAYSHI.*

The role of media in society and its impact—positive or negative—has been the subject of debate in many countries. Academics differ on the impact of media on community and society. Here’s a question to the sceptics: if the media had no effect at all, why are so many journalists and media outlets coming under increased attack? Journalists’ work does incite passions, strong enough to put their own lives in peril. If we include social media platforms and the work of citizen journalists under a broad umbrella of media, the answer is an emphatic yes.

The question before us should not be whether media has a role in helping development. In this age of instant and real-time news on the Internet, the real challenge is to keep everyone, including media, interested in development issues that are not as sexy as political scandal, massive corruption, terrorism attacks or plane crashes.

Often times, ‘development’ becomes a much misunderstood, and therefore, abused word. Quite a few journalists equate media’s reportage on development news as “doing the I/NGO thing”. This is a demonstration of poor understanding of the role and responsibilities of media as a watchdog as well as the work of non-government organisations.

Having the benefit of experience of both media and NGO worlds, I can say that NGOs are partly responsible for the unsavoury image they have created about themselves. The public relations or communications arms of many NGOs consider their mission accomplished if the press release they sent to media organisations gets published or broadcast, however brief it may be. Some take pride in having a rolodex of ‘important’ journalists which they routinely flaunt.

When the media questions activities of development or non-governmental organisations, say money spent on overheads and salaries of staff, the latter see it as an attack on the organisations. On the contrary, I believe the media’s factual and fair reporting goes a long
way in ensuring that the stated development activities are on track or close to it.

In 2015, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are to be superseded by Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Media needs to be engaged to ensure that the Sustainable Development Goals are achieved by their deadline of 2030 or getting as close to the target as possible.

Nepal and Bosnia and Herzegovina stand out as fragile states with the most success in meeting MDG targets, said a World Bank report in 2013. “Nepal has met the poverty target as well as the target on maternal mortality and water,” notes the report titled ‘Stop Conflict, Reduce Fragility and End Poverty: Doing Things Differently in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations.’

Indeed Nepal stands out when it comes to achieving some MDG targets. The maternal mortality rate (MMR) and deaths of children under 5 have been brought down significantly. Between 1996 and 2010, Nepal more than halved its MMR—from 539 deaths per 100,000 live births, to 170, according to a 2012 UN report. Other estimates vary between 100 and 290. Similarly, the annual rate of reduction for the under-5 mortality rate from 1990 to 2012 is 5.6 per cent, according to UNICEF. The probability of children dying under five years of age was 142 in 1990. It came down to 42 in 2012, the UNICEF report stated.

The government and community’s efforts to bring down the mortality rates, for which the country got an award, was complemented by constant reporting around the need to go to the nearest hospital, health post or a birthing centre. If a village or a community lacked one, one or the other media reported on it, and the area got one, in most instances.

Media’s Role in Achieving SDGs
The UN member states are discussing 17 new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), proposed by a 70-nation General Assembly working group. There’s a very broad consensus among the UN member states on goal number one of the SDGs: poverty eradication, building shared prosperity and promoting equality. It aims to eradicate extreme poverty by 2030. With rising inequality, the states face additional challenge. One would need an effective watchdog to not just monitor the progress on these goals but also keep the public informed about any irregularities that may happen during the implementation phase. That watchdog is media.

While ending extreme hunger, access to health services (both basic and specialised), universal childhood education and gender equality have long been matters that needed attention and still do, we
have a new challenge to tackle—environmental degradation and climate change. Every season’s erratic rainfall, occasional natural disasters and reports on global warming and ozone layer depletion due to HCFC, which the UN is urging member-states to phase out, are reminders that so far we have not been able to match these challenges with proper response.

Media, by and large, has been playing its desired role with its coverage about these matters. For example, sceptics in the United States who deny that man-made causes are responsible for climate change have been challenged by the media—through in-depth coverage, strong editorials and opinion pieces. The coming years will see not just the climate change deniers sticking to their ground but a number of developing countries which are trying to raise standards of living of their people. Their argument has been and would be that development and economic growth would have to be curtailed if, say, carbon emissions are to be brought down. Clearly, there is need to balance the two.

For this, media needs to be fair and objective. But it also needs an atmosphere where it can play that role effectively. Some governments are still reluctant to acknowledge the need for public access to information and government data. The world over, people do find ways to information by open or secret means and that, sometimes, could lead to misinformation.

In his 4 December 2014, synthesis report to the UN General Assembly, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon urged the adoption in 2015 of the 17 new Sustainable Development Goals, including a commitment by all countries to ensure public access to information and the protection of ‘fundamental freedoms’ guaranteed by UN human rights treaties. It would be a big challenge to achieve the SDGs. Their progress would need an independent tracking. It is the media that is going to provide it.
Development must embrace the dynamic force of culture

Cultural and artistic expression is contributing to human development in many Asian settings and needs be part of the post-2015 agenda, argues GILLIAN HOWELL.

As we enter the new year, the countdown towards expiry of the Millennium Development Goals and agreement on the next set of global development goals begins. However, when the draft Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were released by the UN-appointed Open Working Group at the end of July, those of us looking for the place of culture in these goals were initially disappointed. Not one of them directly references culture.

On closer scrutiny of the 17 draft goals and 169 detailed targets, culture is mentioned four times. It’s part of the goal relating to education. There’s a reference to safeguarding cultural heritage in cities and human settlements. Culture features twice with reference to tourism as part of sustainable economic development, production and consumption.

Slotting culture under those headings positions it in quite particular ways: as something relatively static, something to learn about and profit from. It recognises culture as an industrial endeavour that can generate financial benefit. The education grouping emphasises the role of education in promoting wider respect for cultural diversity.

What the draft SDGs don’t do is recognise culture as an expressive and dynamic force. There’s no acknowledgement of culture as a creative vehicle through which individuals and social groups can explore, affirm, celebrate, reflect upon, critique, and develop their shared cultural assets, their experience of the world, and the world as they wish it to be.

Cultural Action in Development Contexts

Culture is one of those slippery words. It can refer to the values and patterns of social organisation and interaction—conventions, codes, and ‘the way we do things around here’—that all societies generate. It also refers to the expression, production and performance of those patterns, often in the form of tangible artistic works as well...
as ephemeral and intangible manifestations. ‘Culture’ denotes the past at the same time as the present and the imagined future. Each of these dimensions is important to human flourishing and the creation of a life worth valuing, and thus culture has an important role to play in sustainable human development.

If we want human development of any kind to be sustainable, this first definition of culture—the inherent values and patterns that govern social interactions—clearly needs to be part of the picture. Development efforts must be embedded in local culture if they are to be sustainable within that local culture. If not, the initiatives will remain dependent on external drivers, and likely create conflict and instability rather than any improved development outcomes. Furthermore, cultural change can only come about through engagement with the cultural rituals that produce consensus within that society. Best practice benchmarks in international development emphasise tailoring aid packages to local specifics (country but also locality) for this reason.

It is the latter definition, culture as the dynamic expression, performance and production of these social values and patterns, that requires better understanding in development contexts. In consumption-driven developed country economies, culture is often seen as a social luxury, for those with the financial means to enjoy its fruits—concerts, theatre, goods of artistic value that may not have an immediate practical use, and so on. But this misunderstands the centrality of dynamic cultural expression to human life.

Creative cultural expression generates ideas, innovations, and capacities—and, through the very real and potentially transformative social benefits of increased agency, it fuels purpose, connectedness and action. Cultural participation explores and invokes the possible. It draws people into liminal spaces in which to explore and interrogate and live temporarily within alternative realities. It is what Arjun Appadurai has referred to as “the capacity to aspire”, where culture becomes a tool for exploring pathways between the past (tradition), the present (day-to-day norms, priorities, and survival) and the future (aspirations, hopes and the possible).

Support for cultural expression and arts can assume diverse forms within development contexts. The following are just three.

- It can embrace and celebrate the cultural assets of a community, rather than focusing on deficits. This builds autonomy and agency, and maintains cultural continuity between the past, the present and the future.
- It contributes to education and capacity-building through training and learning opportunities both formally and informally. This builds individual skills in aesthetic expression, creative problem-solving and communication, and generates pathways,
widening people’s social worlds and exposing them to new ideas.

- Platforms for cultural expression are a powerful way of giving voice to marginalised groups, including young people, women, ethnic minorities, and those with disabilities. Such groups are often overlooked in community decision-making, but their civic engagement—particularly that of young people—can make a critical difference to social stability. The expressive platforms—including performance, writing and media, and visual expression—are the magnet, but the outcomes can have far-reaching benefits for broader society.

What does this look like in practice in Asia? I wish to leave aside the more well-documented examples of cultural production as livelihood, although such projects offer powerful illustrations of the potential of creative industries in developing country contexts. Rather, I focus here on three examples of programmes where cultural participation is less directly linked to economic outcomes but nevertheless contributes effectively and holistically to multiple development goals.

In Timor-Leste, the culture-focused NGO Many Hands International (MHI) works within a cultural assets framework to build confidence and agency in rural communities, developing structures that support people to take charge of their own development. They do this through artistic projects that bring new voices to the fore, creating platforms through music, theatre, language and visual arts for the sharing of traditional practices across generations and clans, and for exploring and critiquing contemporary challenges and future hopes. MHI’s work includes health promotion, using local systems of knowledge, leadership and change-production to reduce the prevalence of smoking in the community. In all these initiatives, local people are the experts, and central to the projects’ success.

In Afghanistan, orphans and street children have the opportunity to study traditional Afghan music and Western classical music at the Afghanistan National Institute of Music. They receive an excellent education, but in addition, their worlds expand, through interactions with international visitors, and performances in local and international venues. This larger world invites them to imagine a cosmopolitan Afghanistan that is connected to the outside world in multiple ways. Their education provides the links between aspiration and realisation.

Their work also serves a grander purpose, contributing to the regeneration of Afghanistan’s rich musical culture, crushed under Taliban rule, and in presenting an alternative, more positive image of Afghanistan to the world. It gives once-marginalised young people a meaningful and valuable role in creating that alternative future, but all of Afghan society benefits from this reconnection to a celebrated cultural history.
Cultural experiences also—perhaps most importantly in development contexts—develop greater individual and social agency. Experiences as valued contributors to new creative endeavours increases voice and confidence, which can facilitate citizens’ participation in civic action on decisions that affect their lives.

This transformation can take place at any age. Projects such as the Butterfly Peace Garden in Sri Lanka bring vulnerable children—marginalised due to disability, ethnicity, or poverty—into safe, beautiful spaces where the destruction and restrictions of war-ravaged daily life can be set aside. By engaging in all kinds of child-centred creative processes, children can explore and trial new imaginary worlds where they are no longer powerless victims, but inventors, producers, and active agents in creating their own reality. Such a reversal can be transformative in terms of personal growth and development.

Creative cultural expression generates ideas, innovations and capacities.

A Changing Development Paradigm
The debates surrounding the post-2015 development agenda take place within a paradigmatic shift for the aid and development enterprise, characterised by the realisation that the challenges the world faces are complex and interconnected. They cannot be solved in isolation, and the voices of the marginalised need to be explicitly included.

That means people-focused and place-specific responses that empower individuals to take charge of their own development. It means greater coordination and integration between agencies and their efforts, with a longer-term view of sustainable outcomes, empowerment and independence.

To achieve this, programming and responses that build local agency, social inclusion and connectedness, and a sense of meaning and purpose—of being a contributor to something that is bigger than oneself—need to play a central role. Cultural practices and expression can do this, and the SDGs can support their inclusion in programming by recognising culture as a creative driver of society, not merely a reflection of heritage or identity. The task of imagining and realising a possible future is an inherently creative one. If people are to take charge of their own development, they need to be supported to fully develop their capacities to imagine and innovate and act, so that they may create the best possible world that they—that we—all aspire to.
What people are saying about transparency, voice and accountability

Do people actually care about governance? ALINA ROCHA MENOCAL, LAURA RODRIGUEZ TAKEUCHI and GINA BERGH look for answers in global surveys.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are recognised as having significantly shaped the global policy debate and resource allocations for development cooperation, through raising the profile of key aspects of development. Yet despite experience suggesting that governance issues can be crucial drivers of development progress and MDG attainment, the MDG targets were silent on governance. Learning from this, both the High Level Panel on the post-2015 development agenda and the Open Working Group have sketched a governance goal and some targets that could feature in the future set of development goals. But, does the average person consider governance when they think about the things that affect their everyday lives ad what would make the most difference to their wellbeing? In our Overseas Development Institute (ODI) March 2014 paper that assessed views on governance based on survey data from around the world, we found that they do. But governance has many aspects, and there are some that are more important to people than others.

Our starting point were the emerging results from My World, an innovative global United Nations survey on people’s priorities for the future. At the time of writing the report in February 2014, it had gathered over 1.4 million votes from people in as many as 194 countries. (Of these, our sample included 1.3 million voters in 74 countries from across different regions, income levels and political systems data where there were at least 1000 votes. Today there are over five million votes, but the results remain overwhelmingly similar.) The survey asks respondents to select their top six out of 16 possible development priorities for the future that would make the most difference to them and their families.

Of these options, most respondents across different types of countries prioritized “an honest and responsive government,” which ranks only behind such central concerns as education, health, and jobs. Other governance-related options lag considerably behind,
particularly “political freedoms,” which is now the second to last priority.

This was a first hint showing us that some aspects of governance are more important to people than others. Admittedly My World only provides a snapshot of what people care about, and doesn’t reveal much about why they vote the way that they do. So we compared the My World vote results with more detailed regional Barometer surveys that cover larger samples of polling data from countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. This revealed a strikingly similar picture across surveys on what dimensions of governance people value more, and important insights can be drawn from those results.

People are concerned above all about the ability of their governments to “deliver the goods,” namely in relation to economic development, employment, and essential public services such as health, education, and water and sanitation. According to these Barometer surveys (and very much consistent with the My World vote rankings) the number of people pointing to economic concerns and the provision of services as the main challenge that their governments should address is much higher than concerns about democracy and rights. In Asia for example, 40 per cent of people interviewed thought that their government should first address the management of the economy, poverty or unemployment, while less than one per cent thought the first priority should be democracy/political rights.

The regional surveys also show that people do also care about democracy: when asked in the abstract which form of government they prefer, an overwhelming majority of people across countries and income groups choose democracy (and, implicitly, political freedoms). Yet very often their appreciation of democracy is linked to how democratic systems perform (which brings us back to the goods they deliver). Here, overall, assessments are much less positive.

As the growing number of popular protests and uprisings around the world indicates, there is profound dissatisfaction across the board with the ability of democracies to deliver tangible benefits and to improve the wellbeing of ordinary citizens. People are clearly clamouring for greater democratic rights and increased representation. But more fundamentally, this popular mobilization is also an expression of a profound revulsion with leaders and political systems perceived to be deeply corrupt and unwilling or unable to address the everyday needs of citizens. Corruption is a central part of this story, since it has such a big impact on people’s satisfaction with their governments and their perceptions of its performance overall.

Established Western democracies have not been spared. Popular disenchantment has become even more pronounced in the
context of the financial crisis and austerity programmes. As the rise of the “Occupy” movement and its slogan (“We are the 99 percent”) shows, people are deeply frustrated with the inability of democracy to provide goods for ordinary citizens, as well as the perceived social and economic inequality, corporate greed, and corruption that have come to characterize it.

Associated with this, we find that democracy and its institutions are facing a severe crisis of representation in the face of growing citizen dissatisfaction and disengagement. People experience difficulty engaging with the state effectively and experience deep flaws in the ‘democratic’ forms of government of their countries. Crucial institutions of democratic representation and accountability, including both parliaments and political parties, are consistently ranked as the institutions that people trust the least, while the military earning the highest measure of public confidence. Even where people feel that they are able to express their “political voice” (through elections for instance, or the freedom to say what they think), they don’t believe that their voice is being heard and can make a difference on how their governments work. This reinforces feelings of frustration at a widely perceived lack of government responsiveness and accountability, and is a particularly worrisome trend among young people.

So what does this all mean? Our study shows that people are concerned first and foremost about the ability of their governments to ‘deliver the goods’ and that often their appreciation of democracy is linked to how democratic systems perform. The preference for effective government has important implications for state legitimacy. Clearly the question of legitimacy is multifaceted and complex, and historically, states have relied on a combination of sources and methods to build public trust. But these survey findings suggest that performance-based legitimacy is particularly important.

The vast majority of countries today are formal democracies. People still seem to expect that such systems are inherently better at providing public goods, even though this isn’t necessarily the case. This puts democracy under considerable pressure. The most urgent challenge of the 21st century, therefore, may well be to strengthen democracies around the world so that they can respond to the demands of their populations more effectively. If they fail to do so, democratic institutions run the risk of becoming increasingly hollow and perfunctory, at least in the eyes of the public.

Our findings also have important implications for emerging global development goals set to take shape after the MDGs expire next year. Clearly, governance matters to people and institutional structures and dynamics are essential in shaping development outcomes and in explaining differences in progress between countries.
Including it as a stand-alone goal would signal its centrality to development outcomes, as the High Level Panel has recommended. But as our assessment here highlights, it is also essential to understand governance above all as a government’s ability to deliver tangible goods and benefits that make a difference to people’s everyday lives. Governance must also be addressed as an objective that cuts across areas such as health, education, and the management of water and other natural resources.

This also highlights the importance of transparency, voice and accountability as integral components of governance and essential for democratic institutions to meet the expectations of citizens around the world. For example, Nepal has made significant progress in improving maternal health care by devolving decision-making to local bodies, as well as by strengthening oversight and accountability among government, service providers, and local communities. Similarly, in Uganda community based monitoring was linked to large increases in healthcare utilization, health workers’ performance and improved child health outcomes.

Translating these ideas into consensus on a new development framework will not be easy. As the assessment highlights, it is also essential to understand governance as a means to improve a government’s performance and its ability to delivery tangible goods and benefits that make a difference to people’s everyday lives. Doing so requires a significant change in the way we think about development, as well as in the current strategies to promote governance in the post-2015 framework. We will need to move away from normative conceptions of change and toward more practical approaches grounded in contextual realities. But this shift will be essential for the next set of development goals to have substance, and to fill the gaps that matter most to people.
As its title suggests, the book is a tribute to human rights in the Pacific but much more than this, it takes a critical look at the role of journalism in the scheme of things. With a career in journalism and teaching that spans 35 years, Professor Robie presents his journalistic adventures in the Pacific, capturing the struggles of the oppressed and the pivotal role that journalism can play to initiate positive change.

First-hand experience of human rights stories in a vast region over many years makes this work an exceptional historical document. It covers colonial legacy conflicts such as the massacre of the Melanesians revolting against French rule in New Caledonia, indigenous struggles in Canada, the Ampatuan massacre in the Philippines and the “surreal and ghostly” atmosphere of environmental devastation in Papua New Guinea.

While there is a clear protest against regimes that threaten free press and persecute journalists, Robie proposes a journalism model that is part of the solution rather than the problem. He calls for deliberative, peaceful and developmental journalism. Often mistaken for the ‘soft approach’, peaceful journalism focuses on “exposing truths on all sides” and requires commitment to investigative journalism. Deliberative and developmental journalism takes on the hard questions – the ‘how, why’ and ‘what now’ of governmental and commercial projects, with a view to improving social conditions.

There is a sense of finality in the epilogue which prescribes adherence to the same high ethical standards that the media expects of those in power. It reinforces Robie’s staunch belief in the fourth estate when he ponders the abuse of trust and transparency at the start which plagues journalism today.

Robie’s conviction echoes his ancestral legacy which he alludes to - a grandfather and editor, James Robie, who was revered for observing the fourth estate. This is one engaging book every aspiring journalist should not go without.
Political Communication in China: Convergence or Divergence between the Media and Political System?

Edited by Shanto Iyengar & Wenfang Tang
Routledge, 2012
144 pages, US$ 135.00 (hardback)

Reviewed by Ronald Yi Ding, Hong Kong Baptist University

This volume starts with an article by Daniela Stockmann that analyses the rising negativity towards the United States. She relies on computer-aided textual analysis of two newspapers and compares the coverage of the United States in two different periods, one calm and the other one more strained, due to the NATO bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. The findings demonstrate that the weakening state control of media does not necessarily lead to non-biased reports, while the commercialisation of the media under an authoritarian regime can lead to more propaganda and bigotry.

The book has seven articles in total. Four deal mainly with how the media environment relates to political change, two articles are related to Internet activism in China, and one is devoted to the study of Taiwan’s deteriorating expectations about the role of the media. Various approaches and research methods are represented, such as surveys, content analysis, and field interviews.

The book is primarily aimed at scholars who want better understanding of political communication within a context of commercialised media and rise of the Internet in China. One key question is how less powerful but highly commercialised media in a communist system can change media dynamics and public opinion in that country. The thriving but still censored online discussion has not contributed greatly to political communication in the public sphere, and resulted in less cyber mobilisation than some may have expected.

Making Personas: Transnational Film Stardom in Modern Japan

By Hideaki Fujiki
The Harvard University Asia Center, 2013
411 pages
ISBN 978-0-674-06569-7

Reviewed by Erica Ka-Yan Poon, Hong Kong Baptist University

Making Personas is an unprecedented book about the history of Japanese film stardom. It studies how stardom first emerged in Japan in the early 1910s and how it transformed to a film star system through the period until the early 1930s. This book is useful not only to scholars and students with research interests in Japanese cinema, but also to those who are interested in global cinema. The author does not consider Japanese stardom as a self-contained system. Rather, he studies it in a global historical context. Instead of using the Hollywood-versus-national-cinemas paradigm, which will only limit the discussion on how the West influenced Japan, the author uses modernity as an analytical framework. He claims that the early film stardom was related to parts of Japanese modernity such as nationalism, capitalism and consumerism.

Based on this framework, the book first discusses the emergence of domestic stardom in the context of capitalism. Actors were valued for their virtuosity of performances. The decline of these stars was partly due to the proliferation of the images of American film stars, which emphasised physical attributes instead. The book then argues how the production, circulation and representation of these images changed the perception of Japanese audiences about stars. It moves on to discuss the reorganisation of Japanese film stardom in the early twenties, which is a complex combination of emulation of and differentiation from American stardom. Case studies of film stars, such Clara Bow and Natsukawa Shizue, are also provided to illustrate the rise of consumerism and the modern-girl phenomenon.

This book provides insights on how to study East Asian cinemas without reinforcing the binary conception of the West versus the East. It is definitely suitable for film students learning about film stardom. For those interested in East Asian studies, the analytical framework of the book is worth studying and Japanese film stardom offers an example showing how the framework can be applied.
Schizophrenia, the Patient, the Caregiver and the Psychiatrist: Interrelationship in Bollywood films

REETINDER KAUR

This study analyses the portrayal of schizophrenia in Indian Bollywood films with special reference to the individuals suffering from schizophrenia, their caregivers and the psychiatrists treating them. Seven films dealing with schizophrenia as a key element of the storyline were chosen for the study. A number of themes emerged during data collection: schizophrenia, stereotypes and social attitudes; schizophrenia and its treatment; role of psychiatrist; and, aspects of caregiving. Results showed that some films portrayed negative aspects of schizophrenia such as violence, dangerousness and unpredictable behaviour while others portrayed the positive aspects such as sensitivity of psychiatrist and caregivers towards the patient. It can be concluded that positive portrayal of mental illnesses in films can play an important role in changing public perception about mental illnesses.

Cinema came to India in 1896 when Lumiere Brothers, one of the earliest filmmakers in history, presented the first show at Watson Hotel in Bombay. The first film, ‘Raja Harishchandra,’ was produced in 1913 by Dadasaheb Phalke. In 1920, the Indian Cinematograph Act was promulgated, establishing the censor boards under the control of police chiefs in various cities like Madras, Bombay, Calcutta, Lahore (Pakistan) and Rangoon (Myanmar). These regional censor boards were allowed to act independently. After Indian independence in 1947, the autonomy of the regional censor boards was abolished and they were unified under the Bombay Board of Film Censors. Later, via the Cinematograph Act 1952, it was reconstituted as Central Board of Film Censors. The Cinematograph (certification) rules were revised in 1983 and came to be known as Central Board of Film Certification.

Bollywood refers to the Hindi film industry based in Mumbai (previously known as Bombay). Once used as a pejorative term for mainstream Hindi cinema, the Bollywood label has acquired more acceptability synonymous to ‘Indian film industry’ or ‘Mainstream Hindi cinema,’ and connoting a specific national identity (Raghavendra, 2012). Reaching global heights, Brand Bollywood has become one of the most visible ‘Indian’ presences in the global arena today and it is the largest producer of films in the world (www.cbfindia.gov.in).
There is a growing interest among the Bollywood filmmakers regarding mental illnesses and a number of attempts have been made by them in recent years. The portrayal of mental illnesses in Bollywood films is often criticised for its negative imaging (Akram et al., 2009; Akhtar, 2005; Bhugra, 2005). Bhugra (2005) mentions that the portrayal of mental illnesses in films can be negative for a variety of reasons such as stigma, lack of knowledge and focus on entertainment rather than education. Swaminath and Bhide (2009) commented that drama and conflict are essentials for a film to engage audiences, and the mentally ill characters easily serve the purpose. If the main protagonist is mentally ill, the story usually highlights the breakdowns and relapses, absence of good treatment, inevitability of chronicity and finally poor outcome. Malik et al. (2011) points out that the portrayal of mental illnesses in Indian cinema paralleled the broader political and socio-economic trends in Indian society. In the age of political idealism, mental illnesses were portrayed as benign and amusing. With increasing political corruption and instability, mentally ill characters were depicted as cruel, deviant and psychopathic. They suggested that portrayal of mental illnesses is often inaccurate and exaggerated. Sharma & Malik (2013) quantitatively reviewed Bollywood and Hollywood films for the portrayal of Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT). The study found that portrayal of ECT in Bollywood films is often fictional, exaggerated and scientifically inaccurate. The outdated and inaccurate depictions of ECT in films are still a source of misinformation for general public as well as medical professionals.

Methodology
The present study attempts to explore the portrayal of schizophrenia in Bollywood films and to understand the interrelationships between the individual suffering from schizophrenia, the caregiver and the psychiatrist treating the patient. The data for the present study is collected from seven Bollywood films which dealt with the subject of schizophrenia in detail. These films were identified based on personal discussions with friends, Google search on Bollywood films with schizophrenia as the central theme and film encyclopaedias. In each of the film, schizophrenia is a key element of the storyline and one of the protagonists is shown to be suffering from the disease. All the seven films were viewed one after the other to identify the major themes. These themes were coded and entered into excel spreadsheet. A key aspect of coding is its reliability. There are two forms of coding reliability, both of which are important. The first is intra-coder reliability. To deal with first kind of reliability, the films were observed again and again over a period of time to gain a deeper insight, and to arrive at the common themes. The second form of reliability is inter-coder reliability. This form of reliability was taken care of by taking help of researchers involved in similar kind of research. The percentage of agreement was then calculated manually. The following themes emerged in the present study: schizophrenia, stereotypes and social attitudes; schizophrenia and its treatment; role of psychiatrist and; aspects of caregiving.

Results
The films that were analysed have been listed in Table 1. A total of seven films were identified with schizophrenic characters in main lead from the year 1993 to 2010. Four characters were females and three were males. Visual hallucinations were the most common symptom of schizophrenia portrayed in the films under study contrary to studies that suggest auditory hallucinations are far more common than the visual hallucinations among individuals suffering from schizophrenia (Mueser et al., 1990; Teeple et al., 2009). The causes of schizophrenia portrayed in films under study contrary to studies that suggest auditory hallucinations are far more common than the visual hallucinations among individuals suffering from schizophrenia (Mueser et al., 1990; Teeple et al., 2009). The causes of schizophrenia portrayed in films include hereditary causes in ‘Phir teri kahani yaad ayi’, death of loved ones in ‘Madhoshi’, rape in ‘15 Park Avenue’, guilt in ‘Shabd’ and loneliness in ‘Woh Lamhe’. Unlike others, the films ‘Aankhen’ and ‘Karthik calling Karthik’ did not portrayed any causes or life events that led to schizophrenia.
Films are a potential source of psychiatric images. They represent the stereotypes and social attitudes towards mentally ill individuals, their illness and treatment, and on other side, influences and shapes the same (Levey & Howells, 1994; Sharma & Malik, 2013). The films under study represented schizophrenia patients in a stereotypical manner. The most common stereotypes portrayed schizophrenia patients as violent, dangerous and unpredictable; suicidal maniacs; weak personalities; and, possessing negative social attitudes. Violence in the films under study was shown in two perspectives: harming oneself and harming others. Five out of seven schizophrenic characters tried to commit suicide. Some of them were shown attempting suicide more than once (‘Karthik calling Karthik’, ‘15 Park Avenue’ and ‘Woh Lamhe’). Two female protagonists who suffered from schizophrenia in films ‘Phir teri kahani yaad ayi’ and ‘Woh Lamhe’ die at the end. The schizophrenic characters were portrayed as suspicious in ‘Phir teri kahani yaad ayi’ and ‘Woh Lamhe’. They sometimes turned violent (‘Woh Lamhe’), shouted at their caregivers (‘15 Park Avenue’) and pelted stones at others (‘Phir teri kahani yaad ayi’). The caregivers also perceived these individuals to be dangerous (‘Phir teri kahani yaad ayi’). This kind of violent behaviour and perceived dangerousness formed an important part of the characterisation of individuals suffering from schizophrenia in the films under study. Similar observations have been made by Owen (2012) who suggested that cinematic description of schizophrenia is stereotypical and characterised by misinformation about its symptoms, causes and treatment. The stereotypical categories such as violence (Akram et al., 2009; Owen, 2012), dangerousness (Akram et al., 2009), suicide maniac (Hyler et al., 1991) and schizophrenia as possessed (Byrne, 2009) have been reported by various authors in Hollywood films and television series. The other stereotype of schizophrenia portrayed in the film ‘Aankhen’ is that these individuals possess extraordinary abilities and intelligence. Similar portrayal of extraordinary abilities and intelligence have been made in the Hollywood film like ‘A Beautiful Mind’ based on the life of mathematician and Nobel prize winner John Nash. The films also portrayed certain characters such as Karthik of ‘Karthik calling Karthik’ and Meethi of ‘15 Park Avenue’ as ‘weak personality’. Yap et al. (2010) and Wright et al. (2011) suggest that individuals’ sufferings from mental illnesses are sometimes considered as weak but not ill.

The content analysis of the films under study suggest that there was frequent use of terms like ‘pagal’ (mental) and ‘pagal khana’ (mental asylum) in films such as ‘Aankhen’, ‘Phir teri kahani yaad ayi’, ‘15 Park Avenue’ and ‘Karthik calling Karthik’. The terms such as ‘insane’ in ‘Phir teri kahani yaad ayi’, ‘mad’ in ‘Karthik calling Karthik’, ‘psychotic’ in ‘Woh Lamhe’, ‘discoloured life’ in ‘Madhoshi’ were used for individuals suffering from schizophrenia. Caregivers in some films such as ‘15 Park Avenue’ suggested that the patients suffering from schizophrenia, stereotypes and social attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Film</th>
<th>Year of release</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Director</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Phir teri kahani yaad ayi’</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Pooja Bhatt, Rahul Roy</td>
<td>Mahesh Bhatt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Aankhen’</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Amitabh Bachchan</td>
<td>Deepak Tijori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Madhoshi’</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Bipasha Basu, John Abraham</td>
<td>Tanveer Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘15 Park Avenue’</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Konkona Sen, Shabana Azmi</td>
<td>Aparna Sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Shabd’</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Sanjay Dutt, Aishwarya Rai</td>
<td>Leena Yadav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Woh Lamhe’</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Kangna Ranaut, Shiny Ahuja</td>
<td>Mohit Suri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Karthik calling Karthik’</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Farhan Akhtar, Deepika Padukone</td>
<td>Vijay Lalwani</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Films dealing with schizophrenia
Schizophrenia are dangerous and cannot be kept at home. Another film, ‘Aankhen’, portrayed negative social attitudes at workplace. The treatment of schizophrenia is portrayed as a ‘barbaric’ method which does not treat patient instead aggravates the problems for the patient.

**Schizophrenia and Its Treatment**

All the films except one portrayed biomedical system of medicine for treatment of schizophrenia patients. The treatment included medication and use of ECT, which has been practised in psychiatry for over 75 years (Gazdag et al., 2009). It is an important treatment modality for reasons such as its cost effectiveness and requirement of less time and manpower in developing countries like India (Rajkumar, 2014). There are still no stringent guidelines on the use of ECT and unmodified ECT is still widely practiced in India (Andrade, 2003). The current practice of modified ECT includes the use of anaesthesia and muscle relaxants (Gangadhar et al., 2010). Thus, the patients are rendered unconscious before receiving the therapy and the convulsions are reduced to twitching rather than thrashing. In the analysis of ECT in the Bollywood films, it was found that caregivers in some films opposed its use as they considered it a ‘barbaric’ method of treatment (‘15 Park Avenue’) and an ineffective way of treating schizophrenia that may deteriorate the patient’s condition (‘Woh Lamhe’). The patients were shown suffering during the ECT in films such as ‘Madhoshi’ and ‘Woh Lamhe’. These findings are similar to the findings of Byrne (2009) who pointed that the treatment of mental illnesses is rarely portrayed positively. Sharma and Malik (2013) also reported that the portrayal of ECT in Indian films is often fictional, exaggerated and scientifically inaccurate. The method of ECT is often depicted inaccurately and it is portrayed as a punitive, futile and barbaric method. The most appropriate and scientific portrayal of ECT was made in *15 Park Avenue*. Before conducting the ECT, the psychiatrist and the caregiver discussed about the procedure. The psychiatrist assured caregiver that ECT is an effective way of treatment. The film showcased the use of modified ECT and patient was given anaesthesia before giving the therapy. A detailed description of treatment given and its outcome are given in Table 2.

Only one film portrayed the use of traditional healing in treating mentally ill patient (‘15 Park Avenue’). In ‘15 Park Avenue’, a traditional healer is called by the patient’s mother as she believed that her daughter was possessed by an evil spirit. The healer was portrayed beating the patient and pulling off her hair. This portrayal can be supported by Indian studies which state that traditional healing is common for mental illnesses such as schizophrenia (Kate, 2012). A number of observations can be made from the portrayal of encounter between healer and the patient: mental illnesses are believed to be caused by spirit possession and traditional healers are considered to be appropriate for the cure. These healers sometimes may be violent towards the patient and the family members who believe in healers ignore this violent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Film</th>
<th>Treatment given</th>
<th>Outcome of treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Phir teri kahani yaad aayi’</td>
<td>Medication</td>
<td>Futile, patient commits suicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Madhoshi’</td>
<td>Medication and ECT</td>
<td>Futile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘15 Park Avenue’</td>
<td>Medication and ECT</td>
<td>Patient became calm, participative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Shabd’</td>
<td>Treatment not shown, admitted to asylum</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Woh Lamhe’</td>
<td>Medication and ECT</td>
<td>Futile, attempts to commit suicide, dies at the end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Karthik calling Karthik’</td>
<td>Medication</td>
<td>Effective, starts leading a normal life</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
behaviour. The reason for popularity of healers in the Indian context is that healer’s explanatory model of illness matches with that of family. This film also showcased a conversation between the psychiatrist and the patient’s family about a traditional healer who could see and talk to the spirits. The psychiatrist sarcastically commented that the healer could also be suffering from schizophrenia.

Schizophrenia was the central theme in the films under study. Thus, these films portrayed the biomedical treatment more often. This is not the case with Bollywood horror films, where the characters are shown to exhibit the symptoms similar to that of schizophrenia but they resort to traditional healers for cure. The examples include films such as ‘Bhoot’ (2003), ‘Phoonk’ (2008) and ‘Rokkk’ (2010).

**Role of the Psychiatrist**

Six of the seven films under study had male psychiatrists. This gender bias can be supported by the fact that females constitute only 15 per cent of total psychiatrists in India (Sood & Chadda, 2009). The only female psychiatrist was shown counseling the patient; while male psychiatrists were not shown communicating directly with their patients. This representation can be supported by previous studies which state that women are considered to be more empathetic and more suited to counseling purposes (Sood & Chadda, 2009).

Previous analyses of portrayal of psychiatrists in Bollywood films suggest that they are represented as incompetent and often violate ethical boundaries (Banwari, 2011). Banwari (2014) suggest that psychiatrists’ portrayal in Indian cinema is caricatured and may perpetuate negative perceptions about psychiatry. Predominantly negative images of psychiatry and the psychiatrists have been found by Dudley (1994) and Rosen et al. (1997). Similar observations have been made by Gharai-beh (2005) with respect to Hollywood films.

Negative portrayals of psychiatrists have been presented in the films under study. The psychiatrist sometimes were portrayed breaching confidentiality (doctor discloses the identity of a mentally ill patient in medical convention in ‘Madhoshi’), prescribing ECT without anaesthesia (‘Madhoshi’ and ‘Woh Lamhe’), offering weird advice (‘Madhoshi’) and not able to diagnose the illness correctly (‘Karthik calling Karthik’).

The psychiatrists were portrayed in two types of interactions: patient-psychiatrist and caregiver-psychiatrist. Only one film showed a direct interaction between a patient and the psychiatrist (‘Karthik calling Karthik’). The role of the psychiatrist was limited as she was not able to diagnose her patient’s illness correctly, and took few months to realise that her patient might be mentally ill and needs help. Other films did not show any direct interaction between patient and the psychiatrist. Some of the films portrayed detailed discussions between caregivers and the psychiatrists about patients and their treatment. In ‘Madhoshi’, psychiatrist tells the family that the patient has created an imaginary man who does and speaks whatever the patient wants. The doctor told the family about the symptoms of schizophrenia such as talking to imaginary people and screaming out to someone. Psychiatrists in ‘Madhoshi’, ‘Woh Lamhe’ and ‘15 Park Avenue’ told the family that imaginary people in lives of patients are a reality for them and they believe in their existence. The psychiatrists focussed on the symptoms related to visual hallucinations only. Sometimes psychiatrists gave very negative opinion about the treatment and its outcome. The psychiatrist in ‘Madhoshi’ told the family that it is impossible to treat the patient and gave no treatment options for her but in ‘Woh Lamhe’, psychiatrist assured that patient would be fine with the help of medication and therapy. The most detailed interaction between psychiatrist-caregiver was shown in 15 Park Avenue. There were discussion about background and personality traits of the patient, treatment options especially Electro Convulsive therapy (ECT), hospitalisation of patient in case of severity, improving self-esteem of the patient, reducing loneliness of patient, involving patient in daily activities and appreciating the patient for the same and caregiver burden.
Aspects of Caregiving

Mental illnesses such as schizophrenia affect the caregivers and impose a considerable burden on them (Vasudeva et al., 2013; Jagannathan et al., 2014). The films portrayed one individual as primary caregiver and all other individuals played a little role in caregiving. The primary caregivers' ranged from a passionate lover who continued romantic feelings despite diagnosis of schizophrenia ('Woh lamhe') to a girl who distanced herself from her lover ('Karthik calling Karthik') to a sister who worked hard to improve the self-esteem of her sister ('15 Park Avenue') to parents who lost faith in treatment ('Madhoshi'). Schizophrenia was shown to affect lives of primary caregivers in terms of their reduced social interactions ('Phir teri kahani yaad ayi', 'Madhoshi', 'Woh lamhe'), disturbed personal relationships ('15 Park Avenue') and inability to fulfil professional commitments ('Madhoshi', 'Woh lamhe', 'Phir teri kahani yaad ayi' and '15 Park Avenue'). A detailed account of caregiving, burden of caregiving and emotional difficulties of caregivers was shown in '15 Park Avenue'. The film suggested that: caregiving a mentally ill person is a full-time job and the caregiver may lose some of the important life opportunities or relationships in the process. Burden of caregiving was the important aspect of schizophrenia that was portrayed in the Bollywood films such as '15 Park Avenue', 'Madhoshi' and 'Woh lamhe'. The coping strategies used by caregivers were emotional catharsis, discussion about the illness with family or friends, and social distancing.

Feeling of guilt and self-blame were common among the caregivers who considered themselves as responsible for illness of the patient. The films focussed on certain tragic life events that lead to the illness and caregivers blamed themselves for these events or their inability to help individuals to cope with these illnesses. Similar observations have been made by a number of researchers in Indian context who reported the feelings of uncertainty, shame, guilt and blame (Srivastava, 2005; Balasubramanian, 2013).

Discussion

The public’s knowledge about mental illness parallels the cinematic stereotypes (Gabbard & Gabbard, 1999) and films are a ‘cultural reservoir’ that helps in understanding the public knowledge of and attitudes towards mental illnesses (Cape, 2003). Thus, the films can be used to train psychiatrists, study therapeutic relationships between therapists and patients (Bhugra, 2005) and deal with mental health stigma (Swaminath & Bhide, 2009). The following considerations are to be made to use films for training purposes: the symptoms, causes and treatment of mental illness; role of psychiatrist; and public attitudes are accurately portrayed. The common stereotypes such as violent behaviour, dangerousness, suicidal tendencies and unpredictable behaviour need to be dispelled. The misinformation and stereotypes about mental illnesses and their treatment contribute to stigma (Byrne, 2009) and films as a medium may be used to dispel this stigma (Swaminath & Bhide, 2009). Owen (2012) have stressed upon the need to provide accurate information about the mental illnesses in the mass media as this would help the mentally ill individuals and their families to cope with illness. The Central Board of Film Certification, a statutory body under Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, can play an important role in making sure that scientifically accurate messages are conveyed to the public.

An effort has been made by Central Board of Film Certification to discourage scenes in films that show abuse or ridicule of mentally challenged persons (cbfindia.gov.in). The more detailed guidelines about portrayal of mentally ill individuals in films are issued by Indian Broadcasting Foundation, an apex organisation representing television broadcasters, that discourages the content which: ridicule, mock and scorn mentally challenged individuals; stereotype mental health professionals as unethical or exploitative, encourage superstition about causes of mental illnesses, portrayal of mentally ill individuals as violent or dangerous. Such content has been listed as harmful.
and offensive in self-regulatory content guidelines (www.ibfindia.com).

Media has become an important aspect of culture and anthropologists are particularly interested in understanding of interrelationships between media, culture and health (Kaur & Sinha, 2011; Kaur, 2013). The present study provides useful insights into the portrayal of schizophrenia in Bollywood films. On one hand, the films under study portrayed the negative aspects of mental illnesses such as popular beliefs, stereotypes and perceptions about treatment. On the other hand, the films like ‘15 Park Avenue’ highlighted the aspects such as caregiving and the importance of discussion between psychiatrist and caregiver that were never portrayed in the previous films. The same film also portrayed the popular beliefs about causes of schizophrenia and treatment seeking behaviour of the families with patients suffering from schizophrenia. It can be concluded that filmmakers should focus on the positive and educational aspects of films particularly those deals with sensitive subjects like mental illnesses. Positive portrayal of mental illnesses in films can play an important role in changing public perception about these illnesses.

References


Impact of Mobile Phones on Social Life among Youth in India

TRIPURA SUNDARI

The media landscape has changed dramatically in recent decades, from one predominated by traditional mass communication formats to today’s more personalised network environment. Social network sites, online games, video-sharing sites, and gadgets such as iPods and mobile phones are now fixtures of youth culture. They have so permeated young lives that it is hard to believe that less than a decade ago these technologies barely existed. Today’s youth are struggling for autonomy and identity as did their predecessors, but they are doing so amid new worlds for communication, friendship, play, and self-expression. This paper seeks to provide empirical data on the impact of the mobile technology on the social life of Indian youth. Taking a survey of some 1200 young Indians, the paper discovers their dependency on this new medium.

Mobile phones came to India in the mid-1990s, when the Indian government liberalised the economy to let Western companies and products enter the Indian market (Fraunholz & Unnithan, 2006). Initially due to high costs, mobile subscriptions were very few and the service was mainly adopted by business executives and professionals. However, in January 2000, the government introduced a new policy called NTP99, which replaced the high-cost, fixed licensing regime with a lower cost licensing structure. This led to a 90 per cent drop in cellular tariff rates (Fraunholz & Unnithan, 2006). More than half of India’s population is under 25 years of age and the mobile phone is the only medium that reaches more than half the Indian population (TRAI, 2011–2012).

Influence of Mobile Phones

The rise in the popularity of mobile phones in recent years has also attracted the attention of researchers on this medium. Some of the common cell phone related research topics include cell phone use while driving (Caird, Willness, Steel & Scialfa, 2008; Horrey & Wickens, 2006; McCartt, Hellenga & Braitman, 2006), cell phone etiquette (Lipscomb, Totten, Cook & Lesch, 2007), cell phone cultures and behaviours (Campbell & Park, 2008; Bakke, 2010; Ling, 2004), text messaging (Pettigrew, 2009), health risks from cell phone nation (Anna, Kari & Anssi, 2006) and cell phone dependency/addiction (Billieux, Linden, Dacremont, Ceschi & Zermatten, 2007; Ezoe et al., 2009; Zulkerfly & Baharuddin, 2009).

Recent studies suggest that cell phones have...
evolved into something more than a simple communication tool, gaining its own place in various aspects of social interaction. For instance, a qualitative study on Australian adolescents revealed that cell phones play an integral part in the lives of young Australians (Walsh, White & Ross 2008). Some of the participants in the study reported very strong attachment to their cell phones; they felt as though their cell phones were part of them. In another qualitative study, Bond (2010) examined children’s cell phone use and concluded that cell phones were fundamental tools with which the children maintain and manage their relationships contributing to reinforced peer ties.

Among the cell phone users in romantic relationships, a higher number of voice calls was associated with positive relationship qualities (Jin & Pena, 2010). Other studies reported that the presence of cell phones provide a higher sense of security in potentially harmful situations. This has contributed to an increase in cell phone value, leading cell phone users to perceive cell phones as a must have tool (Nasar, Hecht & Wener, 2007; Walsh et al., 2008).

Theoretical Perspective
Erikson (1968), in his psychosocial theory, describes post adolescence as a period of searching for identity. Young adults struggle with identifying who they are, to what group they belong and who they want to be. Elkind (1967), in his theory on adolescent egocentrism, pointed out heightened self-consciousness during adolescence. Young adults also become extremely self-conscious and pay significant attention to what peers think of them. Both Erikson and Elkind highlighted increased peer influence on youth. An empirical study also confirmed that youth are particularly susceptible to trends, fashions and styles, which make them more willing to adopt new technological devices and certain behavioural characteristics (Ling, 2001).

Both theoretical perspectives and previous empirical studies suggest that the recent rapid increase in cell phones has influenced multiple aspects of our daily lives, particularly those of young adults. The aim of the current study, therefore, is to examine how important it is for college students to own cell phone, to what extent they communicate on the cell phone, with what frequency they communicate, how serious cell phone dependency has become, as well as general cell phone use (e.g., prevalence, purpose, cost, history). Gender differences were also examined to provide additional evidence that clarifies current controversial findings.

Method of Study
A face-to-face survey was conducted in three cities i.e., Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Tirupati in the State of Andhra Pradesh with young adults in the age group of 18–25 years. The survey was administered to 1200 young adults, i.e. 400 from each city. The two-stage random sampling technique was used to select the colleges and the respondents from the selected colleges. Out of these colleges in all the three cities, six colleges each were selected randomly at the first stage of sample selection. The composition of colleges included professional colleges such as Medical, Engineering and Degree colleges. The colleges drawn are heterogeneous in nature in terms of infrastructure, teaching, student strength and other amenities. The second stage sampling involved the selection of students from these 18 colleges. A total sample of 1,200 students was randomly selected from these colleges. Care has been taken to give equal representation to both male and female respondents.

Participant Profile
Out of the total sample of 1,200, male students constituted 613 in number whereas female students included 587 and majority (50.6 percent) are between the ages of 17–20 years possessing bachelor degrees, 8.8 percent are married, 6.4 percent are in relationship and majority are single belonging to families below four members and live with parents.
Data Presentation

Table 1
Summary of Independent sample t-test by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Level of mobile usage</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

* Significant at 5-percent level
**Significant at 1-percent level

Table 2
Summary of One-way ANOVA and Duncan's Multiple Range test by age

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>F-value</th>
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<td>17–20 years</td>
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<td>24.9055 a</td>
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<td>6.29261</td>
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<tr>
<td>25–28 years</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>27.2239 b</td>
<td>5.94118</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>25.2822</td>
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<td>17–20 years</td>
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<td>2.601*</td>
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<td>17–20 years</td>
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* Significant at 5-percent level
**Significant at 1-percent level
DMRT: Same alphabets beside (a, b, c) indicate insignificant difference
Table 3
Summary of One-way ANOVA and Duncan’s Multiple Range test by education

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<tr>
<th>Education</th>
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<td>Attachment with mobile</td>
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<td>12.3782 a</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>192</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>2.92212</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>12.7489</td>
<td>2.69413</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of mobile usage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC/HSC</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>51.0000 a</td>
<td>11.30265</td>
<td>2.867*</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>8.09970</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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<td>11.21726</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>50.9533</td>
<td>9.44371</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of friendship by mobile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC/HSC</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>16.8780 a</td>
<td>3.47991</td>
<td>3.423**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>17.1282 a</td>
<td>3.59422</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>16.1489</td>
<td>3.06112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results
The chi-square suggests that there is a significant association at 1-percent level between the gender and the mobile phone usage. Male respondents were heavier users than females despite the fact that there was no significant difference in ownership of mobile phones.

The survey also showed that 83.1 percent of respondents acquired their first mobile phone in the age range of 15 to 20 years; whereas, only seven percent of respondents acquired it after they turned 20. This showed that mobile phone is given importance from an early age. However, there was no significant relationship between age and mobile phone usage. Although, undergraduate respondents appeared to be heavier users of the mobile phone followed by those who pursue post-graduate courses and professional degrees. As regards
Table 4
Summary of Independent sample t-test by size of the family

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of the family</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreement score that mobile is a status symbol</td>
<td>Below 4 members</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>25.2649</td>
<td>6.03451</td>
<td>0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4–8 members</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>25.3101</td>
<td>6.19401</td>
<td>1.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment with mobile</td>
<td>Below 4 members</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>12.6414</td>
<td>2.79364</td>
<td>1.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4–8 members</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>12.9217</td>
<td>2.52020</td>
<td>1.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of mobile usage</td>
<td>Below 4 members</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>51.0486</td>
<td>8.68166</td>
<td>0.384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4–8 members</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>50.8000</td>
<td>10.56640</td>
<td>1.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of friendship by mobile</td>
<td>Below 4 members</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>16.0667</td>
<td>3.24525</td>
<td>1.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4–8 members</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>16.2812</td>
<td>2.73847</td>
<td>1.022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5
Summary of One-way ANOVA and Duncan's Multiple Range test by type of relation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of relation</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>F-value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreement score that mobile is a status symbol</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>1,018</td>
<td>25.3512 a</td>
<td>5.99276</td>
<td>3.253*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>25.9747 a</td>
<td>5.67264</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In-relationship</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>23.4310 b</td>
<td>7.55822</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>25.2822</td>
<td>6.09275</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment with mobile</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>1,018</td>
<td>12.6147 a</td>
<td>2.64196</td>
<td>6.323**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>13.5443 b</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In-relationship</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>13.4310 b</td>
<td>2.99187</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>12.7489</td>
<td>2.69413</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of mobile usage</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>1,018</td>
<td>50.8336 a</td>
<td>9.56617</td>
<td>3.121*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>53.2278 b</td>
<td>7.25002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In-relationship</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>49.4310 a</td>
<td>10.07883</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>50.9533</td>
<td>9.44371</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of friendship by mobile</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>1,018</td>
<td>16.1533</td>
<td>3.09793</td>
<td>1.100</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>In-relationship</td>
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<td>15.6724</td>
<td>2.76182</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>16.1489</td>
<td>3.06112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was observed that single, unattached respondents make more use of mobile phones for socialising than those who are married and those who are in a relationship. It can also be inferred, from the Chi square probability value, that the family size of the respondents has significant association with the level of mobile phone usage. Respondents belonging to the family of below four members were heavier users when compared to respondents with bigger sized families.
Table 6
Summary of One-way ANOVA and Duncan’s Multiple Range test by monthly income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly income</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>F-value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreement score that mobile is a status symbol</td>
<td>Below Rs. 10000</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>24.9558 a</td>
<td>6.47931</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Rs. 10000 – Rs. 30000</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>25.4961 a</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rs. 30000 – Rs. 50000</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>24.7105 a</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Above Rs. 50000</td>
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<td>27.6512 b</td>
<td>5.85086</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>25.2822</td>
<td>6.09275</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment with mobile</td>
<td>Below Rs. 10000</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>12.6878 a</td>
<td>3.04978</td>
<td>3.030*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rs. 10000 – Rs. 30000</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>12.6903 a</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rs. 30000 – Rs. 50000</td>
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<td>12.6842 a</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Above Rs. 50000</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>12.7489</td>
<td>2.69413</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of mobile usage</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rs. 30000 – Rs. 50000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Above Rs. 50000</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>50.9533</td>
<td>9.44371</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of friendship by mobile</td>
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<td>16.0110</td>
<td>3.25974</td>
<td>1.570</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rs. 30000 – Rs. 50000</td>
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<td>3.17410</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>3.16420</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
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<td>3.06112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sample holds majority of respondents with monthly income below Rs. 10,000, but the majority of heavy users of mobile phone have the monthly income above Rs. 50,000. Thus, the study indicates that there is a significant relationship between monthly incomes of respondents on the level of mobile phone usage.

Noticing the significant association of gender, education, relationship status, family size and living status on mobile phone usage, the researcher studies the influence of these independent variables with each dependent variable through one way ANOVA separately and the findings are explored.

Usage Patterns
The majority (68 percent) of respondents makes and receives an average of (62.9 percent) one to ten calls per day. Majority daily sends one to ten messages and daily receives (48.3 percent) 11 to 20 messages on an average. According to the survey, 85.4 percent of respondents spend around one to five hours for calls and 30 minutes a day for messaging and have a tendency of answering all the calls. Of the total respondents, 89.2 percent of respondents have pre-paid connections and 92.6 percent recharge every month at once by spending around Rs. 3,000–5000 towards expenditure per month and use full talk time. Majority use mobiles more outside the home and more often during nights and on weekends. Moreover, majority opined that connectivity with family is the main motive for the purchase of mobile phones. They also give importance to brand, cost and design. Of mobile phone applications, most prefer to use...
the music player and camera. Some 48.1 percent listen to music daily as a means of entertainment and a way to alleviate boredom. Instant messaging is another priority usage, 43.3 percent use their mobile phones to send and receive messages, 51.4 percent use mobile phones as alarm clock or daily reminder; and, 42.8 percent use it as a calculator.

Majority, 52.6 percent, said they use their phones to keep time; 25.2 percent use Bluetooth and file transfer facilities; while, just 21.9 percent use their mobile phones to send email. At least 30.4 percent admitted that they play games on mobile phones daily, 24.6 percent use it to get sports’ updates; but, only 22.9 percent use it for surfing Internet. This clearly shows that the link to the Internet is not a primary use of mobile phone among Andhra Pradesh youth.

Airtel was found to be the first choice of service providers followed by 17.9 percent reported BSNL as their preferred mobile connection. But it has been observed that some of the respondents have tried Airtel in combination with Vodafone, BSNL, Reliance and Idea. This finding in its own limited manner indicates the supremacy of Airtel over the other market players with varied packages. The most frequent combination of service providers seen were Airtel-Idea and Vodafone-Idea. Only 36.3 percent of respondents have two mobile phones at present.

Mobile Phone as a Status Symbol
Because of the development of new applications for mobile telephony, it has the potential to displace other elements of social activity and even to enhance their social image. The survey reflected that young people perceived and used cell phones as fashion statement and status symbol.

Majority (38.5 percent) of males indicated that mobile phone was considered a status symbol for them. Moreover, there is a significant relationship, at a five percent level between the age of respondents and the level of agreement that mobile phone is a status symbol. Majority of respondents belonging to the age group of 21–24 years (31.7 percent) and the age group of 25–28 years (31.5 percent) claimed that mobile phones was a status symbol. The cross tabulation results showed that there is a significant relationship between the education of the respondents and the level of agreement that mobile phone is a status symbol. Those with professional degrees (42.4 percent) agreed that mobile phone was a status symbol. But, there is no influence of relationship status and family size to phones being a status symbol. There is a significant relationship between the monthly incomes of respondents and the level of agreement that mobile phone is a status symbol. Majority of (48.8 percent) respondents with monthly income above Rs. 50,000 are of high agreement that mobile is a status symbol for them.

On the other hand, some respondents said status was only secondary to the feeling of security with regards their ownership of a mobile phone even though they also perceived cell phones as a technology from the West and as a fashion item.

Some 34 percent averred that mobile phone has improved their life. Majority (41.3 percent) revealed that the model of the mobile phone tells how fashionable they are among peers. Majority (52.2 percent) agreed that having mobile phone is a key to social life these days and they (51.4 percent) have also agreed that it has become a new form of entertainment to communicating with friends; while, 45 percent said that mobile phone allows them to use their time efficiently.

Attachment with Mobile Phones
The mobile phone has become the favoured communication tool for youth and their parents. For the respondents, the attachment to their phones is an area of conflict and regulation. While, married respondents (54.4 percent) and respondents in relationship (50 percent) claim a high level of attachment with mobile phone than those who are single. Thus, there is a significant influence between relationship status of respondents and the level of attachment with mobile phones. Majority of respondents (58.1 percent) having monthly income above Rs. 50,000
are of strong agreement that they have high level of attachment with mobile phone and majority of respondents (35.6 percent) with monthly income below Rs. 10,000 are of the opinion that they have low level of attachment. Thus, there is a significant relationship between monthly incomes on the level of attachment with mobile phone.

The use of mobile phones as personal objects for expressing individuality and storing private materials was an important aspect of cell phone ownership among young people. A clear majority, 66.3 percent, felt that mobile phone is somewhat private followed by 22.8 percent feeling it to be very private. An absolute majority (61.2 percent) of respondents said they have a particular ringtone to identify significant callers. Majority or 46.8 percent disagreed that their good habits have been diminished by their use of mobile phone, whereas 23.1 percent of respondents said they had been affected. Some 45 percent agreed that using mobile phone while driving is not correct; 51.6 percent agreed that constantly taking calls while talking with family annoys them; and, 48.2 percent agreed that constantly using mobile while visiting family was wrong.

In any case, it is clearly seen from the results that mobile phone has become the preferred channel of the basic communication of youth and these phones have become indispensable among. Majority (59.3 percent) agreed that they use it when they are bored. They feel it to be the best companion for friendships, 53.1 percent of respondents do not agree that they want to spend more time using mobile phones. 49.1 percent disagreed that they feel lost without mobile phone whereas 23 percent agreed that they feel lost without it. A clear majority (49.1 percent) disagreed that they find it difficult to refrain from using it in places where they are expected not to use such as classrooms, laboratories, cinema halls, etc.

Majority (43.6 percent) have agreed that they use it to chat with friends, 38.8 percent agreed that they use mobile to let the others know that they care for them. 43.2 percent agreed that they stay in touch with those people they do not see much. Majority (48.1 percent) agreed that they plan social activities with their peer groups. 56 percent agreed that mobile phone helps for entertainment. 39.8 percent agreed that they pass time with mobile use, 30.4 percent agreed that it is used to look stylish. But 46.1 percent disagreed using it to look stylish. Majority opted ‘convenience’ as the deciding factor to go for texting or a voice call. ‘Nature of friendship’ is the second deciding factor followed by the ‘topic of conversation,’ ‘cost’ and ‘confidentiality’ in the next levels of the priority scale.

### Role of Mobile Phones in Friendships

The youth of today are the first new generation to have an ‘anytime, anyplace anywhere mobile communication culture’. The mobile phone feeds the personal requirements of a teenager—they provide a sense of worth ensuring popularity with friends with whom communications can be continuous. There is a significant relationship at one percent level between gender and level of friendship by mobile use even as 37.4 percent of the male respondents agree with this statement. There is a significant relationship between age group on the level of friendship through mobile phone, with the 25–28 years age group exhibiting the highest significance at 46.3 percent. There is no significant relationship between education or family size and the level of friendships through mobile phones. But, there is a significant relationship between monthly incomes on the level of friendship by mobile phone. It is very high among the respondents (44.2 percent) who have monthly income above Rs. 50,000 and it is low among the 39.5 percent having monthly income between Rs. 30,000–50,000.

Majority (52.2 percent) of respondents said they have stronger friendships with people they can contact via their mobile phones. A clear majority, 56.4 percent, felt that they fit in well with their friends with mobiles. Most of them, 53.6 percent noted that their friends and peers use mobile phones; 48.3 percent agreed that they feel strong ties with their friends because of mobile use and 49.2 percent of respondents agreed that they feel themselves belonging to their friends with the
help of mobile phone. Some 33.9 percent claim that mobile phones help them to create a positive self-image with opposite sex; 34.7 percent said that expensive phones raised their self worth; while, a clear majority of respondents, 83.1 percent, agree that mobile phones are used to coordinate plans with their friends; but only 66.1 percent said they actually do so. Social networking sites on Internet such as Facebook, Twitter, Orkut etcetera are the most preferred methods in forming technology based friendships. Cell phones were the second most preferred gadget in establishing contacts for making friends, followed by random dialing through mobile phones and through various mobile applications. Mobile phones are highly helpful and handy to participate in public activities through telephone voting such as news-based programs (48.8 percent) and 27.1 percent vote for TV reality shows. Some 21 percent said that they do not participate in mobile voting activities. Majority, 78.4 percent, have no health problems on heavy use of mobile phones; while, some 21.6 percent claim that mobile use has caused headache, ear problems, throat infections.

Conclusion
The study clearly indicates that a mobile phone is believed to be an important gadget of communication and is acquired at a very early age. A clear majority of respondents have acquired their first mobile phone at the youngest age of 15 and 20 years. Respondents belonging to the age group of 21–24 years are considerably low users of mobile phone. It was also found that the usage between male and female is significantly varied, even as male respondents were heavy users when compared to females. Meanwhile, social status was also a significant factor even as unmarried and single living respondents make more use of mobile phones for socialising than those who were married or in a relationship. On an average one to ten calls and messages a day are made and received by youth respondents, who spent an average range of one to five hours a day using their mobile phones and treated their mobile phones as a status symbol. Majority has prepaid connections, spend around Rs. 3,000–5,000 per month and use more outside than at home, during nights and utilise full talk time.

References
The Public Sphere, Blogs, and the Pork Barrel Scam: Online Citizens’ Voices on Corruption and Governance in the Philippines

BELINDA F. ESPIRITU

The Internet served as the public sphere for Filipinos who voiced out their opinions and feelings on the 2013 pork barrel scam that rocked the Aquino administration. This research analysed selected blogs and comment threads of Filipino netizens from July to November 2013 over the massive and systemic corruption under the so-called Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of elected government officials. Habermas’s theory of public sphere and William Gamson’s theory of framing are the theories that informed and guided the study. The blogs and comments threads were analysed using framing analysis and speech acts categorisation. The bloggers used episodic, thematic, agency, injustice, and issue or problem-solution frames to voice out opinions on the scam and mobilise fellow citizens to march in the streets to abolish the pork barrel, put an end to all corruption, and call for moral leadership and socio-political reform.

On 26 August 2013, thousands of Filipinos wearing porcine masks and costumes (around 75,000) rallied in the streets of Manila carrying placards while shouting, “Abolish the PDAF!” The rally was dubbed as the Million People March, a massive protest stirred up by comments from the social media like blogs, Facebook, and Twitter, proving that cyberspace links citizens and enables them to express their voices and get connected with others who have a similar crusade or advocacy. The Internet has become the modern agora, or public space, where people can communicate ideas, thoughts, and reactions to societal issues of great importance and relevance to everyone in the nation and in the planet.

The PDAF, or the Priority Development Assistance Fund, has institutionalised pork barrel in the Philippines, as each of its 24 senators receives Php 200 million ($4.5 m) per year and each of its 290 representatives receives about Php 70 million ($1.6 m) for development projects according to their discretion. Beginning in July 2013, a number of whistleblowers have come forward, shedding light on a 220-million-dollar corruption scandal, dubbed by the media as the ‘mother of all scams’ (Heydarian, 2013).
Provoked by the pork barrel scam, Filipino citizens rallied online and offline to abolish the PDAF and put an end to the culture of corruption and patronage politics in the Philippines. The blogs were utilised by the Filipino netizens to vent out their feelings, to express their views on the matter and to rally one another to be vigilant in order to stop the culture of corruption in the Philippines. Blogs are defined as “websites with a regularly updated list of commentary and links to information on the Internet” (Marcel, 2009 as quoted in Janssen, 2010). They are at the fore of a media paradigm shift toward a new, interactive, participatory, telecommunications model (al-Roomi, 2007).

Many blogs post commentary and invite their readers to post comments directly. Since comments are viewable by everyone reading the blog, a dialogue can occur between bloggers and readers, thereby increasing the blogs’ conversational flow and information sharing (al-Roomi, 2007). The ‘comments’ section also help to increase the feeling of the presence of others, enabling bloggers to see which blogs are most popular as well as which topics generate the most discussion. For the purpose of this study, blogs on the topic of corruption and governance in the Philippines, particularly on the pork barrel scam and the government’s performance after the devastation of typhoon Haiyan, and the comments generated by the most popular blogs, served as the subjects of the study.

This study examines the communicative action in the public sphere, which is a space between the state and civil society where public opinion is formed from issue-based information flows, public discussion and debate, and issue-based public contestation (Arnold & Garcia, 2011, p. 2). In the context of public sphere provided by the Internet, the researcher sought to answer the following: What constitutes the public discourse using blogs and comment threads on the pork barrel scam from July to November 2013? How were these blogs framed? What was the prevailing public opinion on the pork barrel scam? How was the public sphere illustrated in this study?

The Use of Social Media for Social Movements
The use of social media for social movements has been examined in the case of Egyptian uprisings and the Arab spring. In his article, ‘Internet activism and the Egyptian uprisings’, Eaton (2013) found that Internet activism was a tool for internet activists to inspire, organise, mobilise, and finally to document. Facebook and Twitter were emphasised to have been useful in more than one of aforementioned functions. Other platforms used were YouTube, Flickr, and mobile phones. The Facebook group WAAKS (We are all Khaled Said), in honour of the 25-year-old activist who was tortured and killed by the Egyptian police, was able to spread information online and mobilise thousands, tens of thousands, then a million Egyptians to protest in the streets in January 25, 2011 against the ageing autocrat Mubarak leading to his resignation in February 2011. Internet activism became an effective tool to mobilise protest through networks leading to the creation of a large insurgent community in Egypt. It made political action easier, faster, and more universal in Egypt.

In his paper, ‘From Arab Street to social movements’, Moussa (2013) postulates that studies of the role of social media in the Arab spring should explore not only how they were used to achieve social movement’s political objectives, but also the extent to which they contribute to constructing more participatory and democratic communication. A main issue in this line of inquiry is the use of social media “to promote dialogical discourse and a multiplicity of voices through full interactive communication that forms the basis of an agonistic public sphere and pluralistic democracy” (p. 61). Carroll and Hackett (2006 as cited in Moussa, 2013, p. 61) proposed analysing media activism through the lens of new social movement theory. Democratic media activism can itself be portrayed as an “archetypically new social movement: a reflexive form of activism that treats communication as simultaneously means and end of struggle” (Carroll and Hackett as cited in Moussa, 2013, p. 62). Moussa
concludes that the Arab spring can be studied through multidisciplinary theoretical paradigms involving the public sphere theory, social movement theory, alternative media theory, network theory, and participatory and democratic communication.

Frames and Blogs
Jha (2008), in her paper ‘Framed by blogs: Toward a theory of frame sponsorship and reinforcement through the blogosphere,’ observed that critical bloggers can reframe a set of facts, provide additional facts, and use rhetorical devices that attract readers. She also found that blogswarms, i.e. opinion storms that brew over blogs, often fundamentally alter people’s views on people and issues. She concludes that media users, today, are partners and conversationalists in the mediated message. The construction of blogs is closer to conversations than to news.

Examining the use of social media in the social movement in the Philippines against corruption takes off from those done in the case of Egypt and the Arab Spring. The focus on blogs as a way of knowing the public agenda is the study’s humble contribution to the body of knowledge on the use of Internet as the modern agora or public sphere.

Framework of the Study
The public sphere is the “arena where citizens come together, exchange opinions regarding public affairs, discuss, deliberate, and eventually form opinion” (Versoza & Garcia, 2011, p. 69). It is the space between the private sphere which consists of citizens, households and firms (business entities or corporations) and the state. Its actors include the public, civil society, public officials (not part of the public sphere but have the obligation to listen to the public and determine their will), the media, and private actors such as private citizens and corporations (Versoza & Garcia, 2011). Civil society groups act and can gain voice and influence in the public sphere, as “it is in the free and open public sphere that social movements acquire a public voice, fight for recognition, assert themselves, seek to shape public opinion, influence leaders and policy makers, and bring about change” (Odugbemi, 2008 as quoted in Versoza & Garcia, 2011, p. 72).

Public discourse in the public sphere is only possible if every subject with competence to speak and act is allowed to: (a) take part in the discourse; (b) question any assertion whatever; (c) introduce any assertion into the discourse; (d) express his/her attitudes desires, and needs; and (e) no speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his or her right as enumerated above (Khan, 2006).

Social scientists are invoking the ‘public sphere’ concept of Jurgen Habermas in analysing the Internet as a forum for free speech wherein private views can be aired and public opinion formed. However, the Internet “provides opportunities for limited revitalisation of the public sphere” (Thornton as quoted in Khan, 2006, p. 149) since these new opportunities are limited to privileged groups or those who have access to Internet, referring to the middle class who have been educated enough to be able express their opinions and thoughts using social media. However, the idea of public sphere is not limited to the West even as they do not have the monopoly of democratic ideals; and the Internet is a worldwide phenomenon. Regardless of religious and philosophical foundations of thought, as long as there is no repression of a free expression of ideas, the public sphere has been made possible in the arena of a technological medium which is the Internet. The Internet also gives the option for the individual to hide in anonymity or use a code name which allows for unhindered expression of ideas and feelings.

As venue for a free exchange of ideas in a public discourse, the Internet has also become the means to democratise news and opinion writing and has become a means for advocacies and social movements. William Ganson, one of the contemporary framing researchers, notes that increasingly, frames are used in public discourse by individuals and groups who have an interest in...
advancing certain ways of seeing the world rather than others (Baran and Davis, 2012). He has traced the success and failure of social movements in promoting frames consistent with their ideological interests. Social institutions and the elites that lead them are able to dominate the social world by propagating the frames serving their interests. Gamson believes that social movements have the ability to generate and promote frames that can bring about important change in the social order and in order to do so, they need to develop cogent frames in expressing their views.

Framing is defined as “the central organising idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue” (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989, as quoted in CommGAP, 2011, p. 6). There are different types of frames. *Episodic frames* present an issue in terms of personal experience and assigns responsibility to individuals; *thematic frames* present an issue in terms of general trends and assigns responsibility to the society. *Injustice frame* incites moral indignation. *Agency frame* promotes the belief that conditions and policies can be changed through collective action (Arnold and Garcia, 2011). An alternative approach is called *problem-solution frame* or issue framing where successful remedies and treatments might be compared with those that are less effective. Framing has the power to influence opinion, attitude, and behaviour change in support of viable solutions to public problems (CommGAP, 2011).

The Internet as the public sphere enables a free exchange of ideas in a public discourse, but individuals and groups need communicative competence to participate in the public discourse by knowing how to frame their messages towards emancipating the social world from any form of entanglement.

**Methodology**

The study is primarily qualitative with a minimal quantitative component. The methods used were framing analysis of blogs and categorisation and analysis of speech acts in the blogs and comment threads according to the three types of speech acts identified by Habermas, namely: *constatives, regulatives* and *avowals* (these will be explained in the next section). The quantitative portion consisted of tabulating the blogs and the number of netizens’ comments triggered by the blogs as well as the number of blogs that used specific frames.

The relevant citizens’ blog sites or websites were identified using purposive sampling. The following were the criteria for the selection of the blogs: (a) they must tackle the pork barrel scam; (b) they must be written within period July to November 2013, which was the height of the scam in the news media and during the Philippine Supreme Court declaration of its unconstitutionality; (c) they must contribute to the diversity and richness of public discourse. Hence, blogs that gained a lot of comments were highly preferred but blogs with few and no comments were included to show the richness of the public discourse.

In view of ethical considerations, the researcher sought and obtained permission from the bloggers to include and cite their blogs in this study. One of the bloggers emailed the researcher that since the blogs are online and are viewable by everybody, asking for permission was not really necessary.

**Results and Discussion**

**The blogs**

Twenty blog posts were included in this study, eight of which gained the most number of comments from netizens with a total of 1,529 comments. These comments illustrate the fact that the Internet has become a public sphere where a free exchange of ideas in a public discourse takes place. Twelve blog posts had few or no comments but were also included to reflect the diversity of ideas in the public discourse.

The post that gained the most number of comments (976 as of December 2013) was entitled ‘Janet Napoles’ pork barrel scam: Theft from a nation?’ It was posted on 31 July 2013 in www.momandpopmoments.com, an anonymous
personal blog, whose author identifies herself as ‘Filipina wife and mother’. She posted two other blogs on the pork barrel scam which also elicited a lot of comments from the netizens, namely, ‘Interest in the pork barrel scam: shocking but welcome’, posted on 6 August 2013 (16 comments) and ‘Pork barrel scam: Every Filipino’s concern’, posted on 16 August 2013 (46 comments).

The next blog post that gained a lot of comments—360 in all—was entitled ‘Janet Napoles’ alleged giant JLN corporation paid less taxes than a public school teacher’ was posted by the journalist-cum-blogger Raissa Robles in www.raissarobles.com and reposted by another blogger in http://merljean.wordpress.com.

Two articles from the blog www.

### Table 1

**Blog posts on the pork barrel scam from July to November 2013 that gained the most number of netizens’ comments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title of blog post</th>
<th>Number of comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 July 2013</td>
<td>Janet Napoles’ pork barrel scam: Theft from a nation?</td>
<td>976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 August 2013</td>
<td>Interest in the pork barrel scam: Shocking but welcome</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 August 2013</td>
<td>Pork barrelistic reactions</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 2013</td>
<td>Janet Napoles’ alleged giant JLN corporation paid less taxes than a public school teacher</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 August 2013</td>
<td>Pork barrel scam: Every Filipino’s concern</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 August 2013</td>
<td>The Million People March – Abolish the pork barrel system*</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 September 2013</td>
<td>Perhaps abolishing the pork barrel isn’t really good for Filipinos’ health after all</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 September 2013</td>
<td>8 reasons why the pork barrel funds and other Presidential funds should be abolished</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2

**Other salient blogs about the pork barrel scam with few or no comments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title of blog post</th>
<th>Number of comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 August 2013</td>
<td>The truth behind P10 billion pork barrel scam Queen Janet Lim Napoles</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 August 2013</td>
<td>Why the pork barrel system needs to be abolished</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 August 2013</td>
<td>Pork barrel: It’s not just about corruption, it’s about patronage</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 August 2013</td>
<td>An expression of public disgust and a call for action</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 August 2013</td>
<td>Removing pork through proportional representation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 August 2013</td>
<td>‘Million People March’ against corruption in the Philippines</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 August 2013</td>
<td>The Million People March and Philippine moral leadership</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 September 2013</td>
<td>Abolishing the pork barrel</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 September 2013</td>
<td>The ‘reform’ argument on the PDAF</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 November 2013</td>
<td>Catastrophe, corruption and compassion</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 November 2013</td>
<td>SC declares PDAF unconstitutional!</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 November 2013</td>
<td>PDAF abolished! A sign of a maturing democracy!</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not indicated</td>
<td>Napoles and the pork barrel: It’s the lousy system</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
getrealphilippines.com also gained a significant number of comments. These were “8 reasons for abolishing the pork barrel” (posted on 24 September 24 2013 with 57 comments); and, “Perhaps abolishing the pork barrel isn’t really good for Filipinos health after all” (posted on 10 September 2013 with 38 comments). The blog produced a lot of critical articles on socio-political issues in the Philippines with the expressed mission “to develop and articulate groundbreaking and insightful ideas and disseminate these to as big an audience as possible” (getrealphilippines home page).

The blog site www.dulzspeaks.blogspot.com is mostly a re-posting of an anonymous netizen’s comments from www.momandpopmoments.com with introductory words and comments from the blogger as a way of disseminating the information to wider audiences or netizens. ‘Pork barrelistic reactions’ was posted in this site on 8 August 2013 and gained 17 comments.

Table 1 shows the posts on the pork barrel scam which gained a lot of comments from the netizens.

Other blogs on the pork barrel scam were deemed salient by the researcher although these gained or elicited very few or no comments at all from the netizens. The blogs were posted by private citizens and civil society groups like the Social Watch Philippines and the Correct Philippines Movement which both advocate for good governance, social change, and the progress of the nation.

Table 2 shows the other salient blogs and forum posts about the pork barrel scam which had few or no comments.

The Frames of the Blogs
A good number of the posts (9 out of 20) used the issue or problem-solution frame to discuss the reasons for abolishing the PDAF versus the argument of reforming it. The researcher found

Table 3
The frames of the blog posts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of frame</th>
<th>Titles of blog posts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issue frame</td>
<td>1. Pork barrel scam: Every Filipino’s concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Why the pork barrel system needs to be abolished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Pork barrel: It’s not just about corruption, it’s about patronage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Removing pork through proportional representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. The Million People March and Philippine moral leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. The ‘reform’ argument on the PDAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Perhaps abolishing the pork barrel isn’t really good for Filipinos’ health after all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. 8 reasons why the pork barrel funds and other Presidential funds should be abolished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Abolishing the pork barrel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episodic frame</td>
<td>1. Janet Napoles’ pork barrel scam: Theft from a nation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Interest in the pork barrel scam: Shocking but welcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Janet Napoles’ alleged giant JLN corporation paid less taxes than a public school teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Catastrophe, corruption, and compassion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injustice frame</td>
<td>1. ‘Million People March’ against corruption in the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. The truth behind P10 billion pork barrel scam Queen Janet Lim Napoles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency frame</td>
<td>1. Pork barrelistic reactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. An expression of public disgust and a call for action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. SC declares PDAF unconstitutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. PDAF abolished! A sign of a maturing democracy!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thematic frame</td>
<td>Napoles and the pork barrel: It’s the lousy system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
one forum post which defended PDAF but the overwhelming call was to abolish it because of the massive plunder of the country’s coffers. Other frames used were episodic, agency, injustice, and thematic frames. Table 3 shows the frames used by the blog posts.

Analysis of Messages in the Blogs and the Netizens’ Comments
To analyse the messages in the blogs and netizens’ comments triggered by the blogs, the researcher used the speech acts categories delineated by Habermas in his speech-act theory he referred to as universal pragmatics (Littlejohn, 1996) to categorise the statements of the bloggers and netizens. Constatives are assertions designed to get across propositions as true. Regulatives are intended to affect the relationship one’s relationship with another person or party through influence. Avowals are designed to express the speaker’s internal condition, to affirm something about oneself.

Constatives correspond to the messages of the bloggers and netizens that used the issue, episodic, and thematic frames in tackling the problem of PDAF abuse and corruption and by proposing the solution of either abolishing or reforming PDAF. Regulatives correspond to the messages of the bloggers and netizens who sought to mobilise or move the readers to action, such as in joining the million people march that transpired in 26 August 2013, or in doing something collectively to end corruption and clamour for transparency and justice in the investigation of those allegedly involved in the pork barrel scam. Avowals were expressions of the internal conditions, emotions, feelings, or reactions of the bloggers and netizens over the pork barrel scam.

Corruption, poverty and development
The blogger MommyJ used episodic frames to present the issue on corruption in relation to poverty and development in the country. Responsibility is assigned to the senators and congressmen who are implicated in the scam as well as to the businesswoman Janet Lim Napoles who is said to be the mastermind of the scam, also labelled as the ‘Pork Barrel Scam Queen’ by the media.

‘Pork barrel scam: Every Filipino’s concern’ posted by MommyJ on 16 August 2013 advocated that the country could have been much better if the money corrupted by senators and congressmen had been used correctly. Senators and congressmen have the grave responsibility to use the money for development projects, not for their own personal benefits. An earlier blog posted on 4 August 2013, ‘Janet Napoles’ pork barrel scam: Theft from a nation?’, argued that poor Filipinos barely meet their necessities while the Napoles children (children of the alleged queen of the pork barrel scam) brandish their extravagant lifestyle, making this the worst part in the picture. This blog further argued that the website of JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation is hollow and unbelievable, while the stench of the guilt of Janet Lim Napoles is strong. Corruption this time should not go unpunished, both for Napoles and the senators who were implicated in the corruption of this magnitude to send the message that pocketing the money pegged for the growth of the nation is not okay.

Abolish or reform PDAF?
Several blogs used the issue frame, or the problem-solution frame, in discussing reasons for the abolition of the PDAF. The problem is the massive and systemic corruption of the priority development assistance funds which contributed to the poverty of many Filipinos and underdevelopment in different areas.

The bloggers considered the pros and cons of PDAF, and propositions were set forth on what can be done to prevent the funds meant for the Filipino people from being corrupted by senators and congressmen. The dominant position of the bloggers was to abolish the PDAF for a number of reasons
(Cuerpo, 2013; Ilda, 2013; and Crisologo, 2013; james27, 2013; The Nutbox, 2013). The reasons enumerated were: (a) the pork barrel system is a system conducive to thievery and corruption and in fact, Congressmen, senators, and politically connected people have been using the pork barrel as a personal piggy bank; (b) the President uses it as a carrot to make sure that Congress does what he/she wants; (c) the pork barrel gives incumbent politicians an unfair advantage during elections since they make projects brandishing their names during elections and most likely use the funds for their political campaign; (d) without the possibility of earning cash through the corrupt pork barrel system, Congress will most likely attract people who are actually in it for public service, and “Filipinos might just vote for public servants who can offer solutions to the country’s problems instead of someone who can give them few hundred bucks or goods—money funded by the taxpayers” (Ilda, 2013). A common argument is that the pork barrel system perpetuates the culture of political patronage, or that it “maintains a pernicious feudal arrangement and nurtures a Master-Servant relation between politicians and their needy constituencies” (james27, 2013).

Crisologo (2013) discussed the arguments of those who are for reforming the PDAF, not abolishing it. He noted that supporters of the reform movement say that the PDAF allows legislators to be more effective in addressing their constituents’ needs, and that their ‘representative’ role extends to providing these needs when they can. Crisologo (2013) pointed out that the theoretical merits of PDAF do not negate the pro-abolition arguments against the PDAF; that “it is undemocratic, vulnerable, and that it causes an ethical tension between the Legislative and the Executive” (ibid., para. 7.)

Questions and assertions have also been put forward on how the money collected from the taxpayers can be better allocated. Carpio (2013) proposed, with a note of urgency, for the government to restructure the system of using the country’s funds and insisted that there should be a foolproof procedure of requesting fund allocation for projects, issuing funds, and checks and balances for such projects. Crisologo (2013) asserted the need for a system-wide budget reform and placing the implementation of projects in the hands of government agencies and local government units which are audited annually and are easy to monitor. La Viña (2013) asserted that legislators should not stick only to passing laws but their role includes identifying projects in their localities and in enacting the national budget that funds these projects. Both Crisologo and La Viña (2013) proposed for citizens’ participation in public finance to fully achieve a transparent system of governance. La Viña furthermore cogently asserted that project determination should be undertaken as a collective action of stakeholders, including the legislator himself.

Moral leadership

The blog ‘The Million People March and Philippine moral leadership’ posted in globalethicsnetwork.org by Joselito Narciso B. Caparino on 27 August 2013 argued that the moral fabric of Philippine government in particular, and of society in general, is what is stake in the clamour for a corruption-free administration. The proposition in the article is that the issues on pork barrel scam and spending of lawmaker’s pork barrel have brought the debate not only to the bureaucratic systems and processes of the Philippine Government, but also to the moral and ethical aspects of leading the country by the President and leaders whose mantra of governance publicly pronounces ‘anti-corruption.’ One blogger puts forward the mandate of moral leadership which seems to have been lost due to the systemic corruption in the handling of government funds in the following words:

Philippine leaders who have access on similar funds coming from the national coffers, public funds per se, must face the ethical and moral aspects of public service and governance. They would be
facing a great political divide on the issue of spending such funds coming from every Filipino taxpayers. Where does moral leadership come into play? Are Filipino leaders still ethical public servants? (Caparino, 2013)

Addressing the roots of the problem
‘Napoles and the pork barrel: It’s the lousy system’ by Dumdum (2013) is the only blog which analysed the situation of the Philippines and the root causes of corruption in the Philippines in a comprehensive, incisive way. It first identified the reasons why PDAF was institutionalised in the Philippines, which are: (a) widespread poverty and the perceived need to “assist the poor”; (b) economic disparity between the Capital versus the countryside; and (c) need for the Executive to get the Legislature’s cooperation. Dumdum then proposed a three-point to truly get rid of the PDAF: (a) economic liberalisation to provide more jobs to the Filipinos; (b) evolving federalism: empower the regions, develop the countryside; and (c) parliamentary system: no gridlock, greater transparency.

Regulatives: Propositions and Calls to Action in the Struggle against Corruption
Propositions and calls to action in the struggle against corruption used the agency frame as these blog articles promoted the belief that social change and change of policies is possible through collective action. These blogs say that what all the Filipinos want, and deserve, is a full, thorough and completely transparent investigation of the Pork Barrel Scam and all the people involved. The people in government must be made to realise that this issue will not go away and the Filipinos’ attention will not be diverted. It is important for PNoy to fulfil his promise of ‘ZERO tolerance’ for corruption and order an open investigation if only to renew the trust that has been destroyed by years of corruption. The Philippines should take a page out of Singapore’s book and their own struggle against corruption.

The blog “Million People March’ against corruption in the Philippines’ by Karlo Mongaya posted on 27 August 2013 in globalvoicesonline.org talked of the impetus for Filipinos to go on a ‘million people march’ by struggling Filipino taxpayers “a day of protest by the silent majority that would demand all politicians and government officials (whatever the political stripes, colour they may carry) to stop pocketing our taxes borne out from our hard work by means of these pork barrel scams and other creative criminal acts” (Mongaya, 2013). Mongaya’s premise for the million people march is that “in the end, no amount of public relations magic can suppress public outrage over the massive plunder of people’s money by government officials and their cronies while millions of Filipinos suffer from hunger, joblessness, and extreme poverty” (Mongaya, 2013).

Another blog post entitled, ‘The truth behind P10 billion pork barrel scam queen Janet Lim Napoles,’ expresses what Filipinos in general felt during the time that the pork barrel scam erupted:

Now is the time, NOW! To let go of this anomalous “pork barrel”. The Filipino people have been clamoring for the abolition of this PDAF for many years. The government needs to act and structure a better system of spending the people’s tax money! Let’s all get involved and shout to the nation to stop pork barrel. But if Congress won’t abolish it or adhere to the concept above, then the People must take it to the streets to compel these public servants to heed the voices of the people they are supposed to serve (jordanatkinson, 16 August 2013).

Another blog, ‘Pork barrelistic reactions’, posted in <dulzscheaks.blogspot.com> on 8 August 2013, urged netizens affected by the pork barrel scam to have a unified voice and to urge the members of the Philippine Congress through voices on the Internet to investigate their colleagues, expressing a note of urgency, exasperation with corruption, and the desire to know the truth and let justice prevail.
Avowals

The avowals or statements expressing the internal condition of the speakers were best seen in the netizens’ comments. Statements expressing anger, sadness, hopelessness, as well as hopefulness and optimism were expressed by the netizens prompted by their reading of the blogs. One anonymous overseas Filipino worker expressed what he felt and thought after reading about the 10-billion pork barrel scam in the following words:

After reading….I think of my children…. What happens if the corrupt and greedy politicians running our country are not replaced. What will their lives be? We who are here in Saudi as OFW sacrifice for them….they steal for their children….. Shame on them…..(in dulzspeaks.blogspot.com, 7 August 2013)

Another netizen code-named mabuhay expressed that he/she wanted the money back from Napoles and her cohorts (20 August 2013; comment on ‘Janet Lim Napoles paid less taxes than a public school teacher’).

Anger was expressed by several netizens to the point of not wanting to pay taxes and proposing to purge those who have corrupted the nation’s coffers. One anonymous netizen (August 4, 2013) who commented on the blog ‘Janet Napoles’ pork barrel scam: Theft from a nation?’, however, expressed hope that all the anger felt and expressed by the Filipino people will transmute into a creative energy for social change and transformation.

Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

The public discourse in the blogs and comment threads can be summarised by the following: (a) corruption is linked to poverty and lack of development; (b) opposing views on whether to abolish or reform PDAF but with the overwhelming clamour to abolish it due to its vulnerability to corruption; (c) the call to put an end to the misuse of the peoples’ taxes and a transparent and thorough investigation of the scam so that justice and truth will be served; and (d) the need for political and moral reform.

In relation the theory of public sphere, the easy access to blogs—for both producer and audience—signifies a more participatory and democratic communication in society where a multiplicity of voices can be heard, and which enables dialogical discourses, the formation of public opinion, and the manifestation of a pluralistic society.

The online voices of the Filipinos signified the public sphere in the virtual realm and served as a means to mobilise protests in the real world. Thus, online protest preceded the street protest and even continued after the street protests were over. This is a similar phenomenon to the Arab spring in Egypt, Syria, and Bahrain, which were marked by intense social media activity leading to their actual street protests. But while the youth played an important role in Internet activism in Middle East countries, different socio-political groups of varying age ranges—mostly from the middle class—joined in the online and street protests in the Philippines who were all united in the common cry and outrage against politicians’ misuse and abuse of public funds.

Future studies can explore the agenda-setting theory to examine the interaction between media and public agenda. How do media and public agenda affect each other and how do they affect policy agenda? Can blogs be considered forms of alternative media? Do they set the agenda for other netizens? Comment threads generated by blogs that became viral can be analysed separately through appropriate methods of analysis.

It will be interesting to examine the websites of civil society organisations and social movements and find out if and how they contribute to social change and affect the policies of the government towards social transformation and progress.
References

Books / e-books


Online Journals / Periodical Articles


Blogs


The Korean Broadcaster Venture into Programme Exports: A Case Study

WON KYUNG JEON

Korean television dramas have become one of the types of broadcasting content most in demand in many Asian countries since the late 1990s. This research examines how the Korean broadcasters succeeded in breaking into neighbouring markets over a relatively short period of time. It also seeks to determine the role played by the Korean government in supporting the marketing of Korean dramas to Asian audiences. Using the case study method, this research uncovers that the subordinate relationship of Korean broadcasters to the government and the relatively early marketisation of the Korean broadcasting industry have more effectively stimulated Korean dramas’ entrance into neighbouring markets. Through this analysis, this research reveals that there has been a considerable gap between the government’s perception of the broadcasting industries and the industries’ actual circumstances.

Since the late 1990s, Korean popular culture enjoyed a rapid rise in popularity, dubbed the ‘Korean Wave’ (Chua & Iwabuchi, 2008, p. 2). In less than two decades, Korean broadcast programmes exports grew to US$2420 million in 2013 (Korea Creative Content Agency, henceforth KOCCA, 2014, p. 2) from US$5.4 million in 1995 (Goh, 2002 p. 40). According to the World Trade Organization (henceforth WTO), Korea was estimated to be the tenth largest audiovisual and related services exporter in the world market in 2007, which means that Korea became the second major exporter among Asian countries, following Hong Kong (WTO, 2010, p. 4; cited in Doyle, 2011, p. 8).

Korean dramas have maintained a dominant position in the overall volume of Korean broadcast programme exports; increasing sales annually from 64.3 per cent in 2001 to 87.6 per cent in 2010 (KOCCA, 2010, p. 2). The prices of Korean dramas have been more expansive than those of Hollywood or of Japanese productions on the Asian market since the mid 2000s (Kim, Y., 2007, p. 137). An article in the New York Times in June 2005 connected the popularity of Korean dramas among Asian viewers with the sales increase in Korean products: “the booming South Korean presence on television and in the movies has led Asians to buy up South Korean goods and to travel...
to South Korea, traditionally not a popular tourist destination” (Onishi, 2005).

In this respect, there is a need for a closer investigation into the nature of the domestic factors that seem to have contributed to the great export success of Korean dramas. As the growth of the Korean broadcasting industry has been significantly influenced by the government, the question of how the government has affected or supported the broadcasting industry’s export strategies may be an essential factor in the multiple dimensions of the rapid penetration of Korean dramas into the Asian market.

This research focuses on the KBS Media, the programme sales subsidiary of Korean terrestrial station Korean Broadcasting System (henceforth KBS), was chosen as the case for this study because the export of Korean dramas has been mostly dominated by KBS, MBC and SBS, the three terrestrial stations.

**Theoretical accounts of the growth of the broadcasting programme trade**

Since the early 1990s, the supremacy of US television programmes in the international programme market seems to have been increasingly challenged by new television productions around the world (Sinclair, Jacka & Cunningham, 1996; cited by Curran, 2006, p. 137). Specifically, there has been a significant increase in broadcast programme trade among peripheral countries with similar cultural and linguistic backgrounds.

Various theoretical accounts of the notable new patterns of transnational media flows can be found in the literature of international media studies. To begin with, globalisation has been argued to be a central driving force in encouraging dynamic interaction among non-Western media cultures. According to Featherstone (1995; cited by Swyngedouw, 2004, p. 27), globalisation is “a rhetorical vehicle to describe the important shift in the economic and political organisation of the world economy and the concept soon moved into the cultural domain”. Hannerz (1997, p. 6) states that globalisation implies not the dominance of one central flow but the “multicentricity of several counterflows”.

Indeed, globalisation is a topic that has been widely addressed by scholars as generating more multi-directional flows of cultural content.
Concurrently, many researchers argue that the framework of cultural globalisation cannot satisfactorily explain the complicated aspects of uneven, overlapping and crisscrossing interactions of transnational cultural content. For instance, Curran (2002, p. 192) claims that the ‘globalisation myth’ fails to grasp the diverse and inequitable circumstances of the international broadcasting market.

In order to compensate for the defects of the globalisation approach to media production, the glocalisation approach has attempted to rescale the disorders of the international programme trade. The overall idea of glocalisation “takes notice of both upwards to supra-national or global sales and downwards to the scale of the individual body or the local, urban or regional configurations” (Swyngedouw, 2004, p. 37). The concept of glocalisation may be employed specifically by contemporary television programmes wishing to enter a wider and increasingly competitive global market. Nonetheless, the glocalisation approach seems to overemphasise the role of local television productions in the global programme trade. However, as Doyle (2011, p. 8) has shown, audiovisual service exports have continued to be dominated by ‘Western’ (US and European Union) countries, which accounted for US$25 billion, 85.5 per cent of all exports by the major fifteen audiovisual service exporters in 2007.

Given the tendency of international programme trends to rely more on the cultural, linguistic or visual similarities between exporters and importers, ‘cultural proximity’ has been regarded as one of the key determinants in understanding the patterns of international programme flow. The concept of cultural discount explains that “a particular programme rooted in one culture will have a diminished appeal elsewhere as viewers find it difficult to identify with the style, values, beliefs, institutions and behavioural patterns of this material” (Hoskins & Mirus, 1988, p. 500). As a result of this diminished appeal, fewer viewers will watch a foreign programme than a domestic programme of the same type and quality. Extending this line of thought, Straubhaar (2003, p. 80) demonstrates that, all other conditions being equal and in the absence of a sufficient supply of national programmes, television audiences tend to prefer programmes which are “the closest or the most proximate to their own culture”.

While the three views discussed above tend to regard the increasing international cultural flows as an undirected process, the marketisation approach based on neo-liberalism identifies the directed and intentional force of the cultural industries in the context of capitalist accumulations. Hesmondhalgh (2008, p. 101) points out that the permeation of neoliberal marketisation in media and cultural sectors, including processes such as the privatisation of government-owned broadcasting stations and the lifting of regulation in an effort to pursue increased profits, have eventually been helpful in changing the view of broadcasting from one of a limited, national source which needs to be controlled by the government to one of the essential factor in the ‘creative economy’ in the information age.

In short, the patterns of international television programme trade have been too broad, uneven and complicated to define through any specific theoretical arguments. Quite apart from the realisation of these complexities, it is worth noting that the marketisation account stresses the role of government in the internationalisation processes of broadcasting industries. Along with the inflow of transnational capital towards the broadcasting industries, government has changed its policy perspective, which previously concentrated on regulation, to encourage broadcasting industries to enter international or regional markets.

**Formation of top-down policies during periods of political turmoil**

In 1948, after the liberalisation from 35 years of Japanese colonial rule, the Korean Peninsula was divided into the capitalist Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the communist Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). In 1950, the peninsula experienced the civil war between the communist North and the capitalist South known as the Korean War. This situation may have led the Korean people to accept eighteen years of the dictatorship of the Park Chung-hee regime (1962–1979), which gained state power through a coup in May 1961.

The Park regime, which ruled the state until Park’s assassination on 26th October 1979, pursued state-led economic growth policies in order to maintain its frail legitimacy. An export-oriented economic strategy focusing on national industrialisation was developed. This policy, which especially promoted labour-intensive manufactured exports, seems to have suited the circumstances of the Korea of the 1960s which had poor natural resources, cheap labour and a tiny domestic market (Kimiya, 2008, pp. 21–22). The focus on export-oriented policies and the natural desire of the people to escape from conditions of extreme poverty led to the sharp growth of the Korean economy from the early 1960s to the late 1980s. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased by an average of more than eight per cent annually, from US$2.7 billion in 1962 to US$230 billion in 1989. It could be argued that the dominant top-down policies, which did not need the normal compromises among different economic sectors, were an efficient way to accomplish fast economic growth.

Apart from the fast growth of the Korean economy, the specific political situation of the Korean Peninsula provided the basis for the Park regime to formulate and operate anti-communism as its primary governing ideology throughout its eighteen years of rule. The Park regime appears to have magnified the military threat to the Korean Peninsula because it intended to use Korean people’s anxiety about a military confrontation as a tool to solidify its illegitimate dictatorship. On the strength of the public’s increasing anxiety, the Park regime subsequently succeeded in gaining in a national referendum held in November 1972 overwhelming support for the Yushin Constitution, which promised him unlimited dictatorial rule (Kang, 2007, pp. 494–495).

Anti-communist ideology was widely used as a rationale for imposing restrictions on the freedom of the whole society, including artistic expression (Yim, 2002, p. 42). Anti-communist ideology contributed to the ‘sound and wholesome’ characteristics of domestic broadcasting content under the Park regime, which differentiated ‘sound’ culture from ‘unsound’ culture. Yim (2002, p. 44) claims that the Park regime promoted a “sound” culture “conducive to anti-communism, nationalism, traditional morality and state-led economic development strategy”.

After Park’s assassination in October 1979, General Chun Doo-whan seized power via a coup d’état on 12 December 1980. The second military government maintained the state-led economic policies of its predecessor. However, the absolute power of the military government gradually weakened in the late 1980s (Nam, 2008, p. 646).

During these periods of autocratic rule, the Korean broadcast industry, especially KBS, was controlled by government. From the initial stage of domestic broadcasting with the opening of KBS in December 1961 to the end of the second military regime in 1992 the broadcasting stations were subservient to government (Park et al., 2000, p. 113; Kim, Y-H., 2001, p. 94).

Case Study of KBS Media
This case study analyses the establishment, reappraisal and development of the export strategies of KBS Media, the programme sales subsidiary of KBS, as a representative company involved in Korean broadcasting programme exports. In addition, this study will examine diverse factors related to industrial and political influence on KBS Media’s strategy formation and evolution.

In particular, the broadcasting of the KBS melodrama ‘Winter Sonata’ (2001) on the national Japanese terrestrial station Nippon Höso Kyōkai (henceforth NHK) in 2003 has been described as the most fruitful export of a Korean drama.
Thanks to the enthusiastic reception by Japanese viewers, ‘Winter Sonata’ earned KBS Media revenue of over US$25 million. This has been recorded as the highest income in Korean drama exports up to the present.⁶

Given this fact, a careful study of KBS Media’s programme exports may reveal how the changing factors in the domestic broadcasting industry are connected to the export attempts of terrestrial stations. Additionally, since KBS has maintained its state-run broadcaster status since its establishment in 1961, a case study of this organisation may more effectively demonstrate the reciprocal relationship between government policies and actual programme exports than studies of the other two terrestrial stations.

**Brief History of Korean Broadcasting**

Before examining the establishment of KBS Media, a brief explanation of the first attempt by Korean broadcasters to enter the international market in the late 1970s will help to explain the historical and political context of KBS programme exports under the autocratic regimes.

According to Chang Han-sung, General Manager of KBS’s television film import team in the mid 1970s, in 1976 the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (henceforth KCIA) received a confidential report from the Korean Embassy in France that North Korean broadcasters had participated in International des Programmes de Télévision (henceforth MIPTV), which is a renowned international broadcasting programme market held annually in France. The KCIA, extremely sensitive to the possibility of competition with North Korea, ordered that all three Korean broadcasting stations must participate in the next year’s MIPTV.⁷

In fact, the export of Korean television programs was impossible because in the mid 1970s these were still in black and white.⁸ Nevertheless, all three broadcasting stations, KBS, MBC and TBC,⁹ sent their film import team managers to MIPTV in 1977, since broadcasting stations did not dare disobey KCIA orders. Of the three broadcasting stations, only KBS was able to obtain an independent booth in order to display several state promotion documentary tapes. Not surprisingly, Korean broadcasters failed to export a single programme after this first display at MIPTV. After the first participation in MIPTV, KBS dispatched their programme import personnel annually to MIPTV throughout the 1980s, mainly to scout for and purchase foreign programs.¹⁰

Yoon Jae-sik, a senior researcher at KOCCA, noted that the regular attendance of Korean broadcasters at MIPTV should not be underestimated. Yoon said that several broadcasting employees became aware of the considerable volume of the international programme trade and were consequently made aware of the possibility of domestic programme exports.¹¹ In the case of KBS in particular, two of the main programme importers, Chang Han-sung and Park Jun-young, participated in MIPTV on a virtually annual basis.

Through their annual participation in MIPTV, Chang Han-sung learned that Japanese television animations were very popular among Western programme buyers. On the basis of his report, KBS was determined to produce television animations for the overseas market, based on the successful case of Japanese animations. This is most likely the first time that the Korean broadcasting industry seriously considered the export potential of domestic broadcast programmes.

In order to carry out animation production and export, KBS organised a new independent subsidiary in 1983. KBS Enterprises was created and provided with human resources and a budget. In May 1987, the new company produced the first Korean television animation, ‘Kachi the Wanderer’,¹² this was sold to French broadcasters and several other European broadcasters at MIPTV in the same year. From 1987 onwards, KBS continued to produce several television animations, exporting these mainly to European and Hong Kong broadcasters. During the late 1980s, KBS export revenues were between US$200,000 and 300,000 annually.¹³
In 1990, with the increasing demand for social democratisation and media decentralisation, a plan for opening cable channels came to maturity with the government’s organisation of a presidential task force (Nam, 2008, p. 646). Chang Hansung was hopeful about the prospects for KBS programme sales to a great number of domestic broadcasters, as well as the overseas market. On the strength of his efforts, KBS Media Enterprises (henceforth KBS Media) was established in September 1991, as a programme production and sales subsidiary of KBS, the largest terrestrial broadcasting station and a state-run broadcaster in Korea. During the same period, MBC and a new commercial station, SBS, also set up independent programme production and sales subsidiaries.

In short, the government unintentionally helped KBS to realise the potential benefits of exporting to the overseas market. Although the government’s insistence on participation in the international programme market resulted in KBS’s initial attempts to export its programmes, it is doubtful whether this intervention can be considered a contribution on the part of the government to KBS’s initial programme exports. Figure 2 shows that all three terrestrial stations in Korea, KBS, MBC, and SBS, established independent companies in the early 1990s in order to strengthen their programme production and sales business.

It is significant that KBS had already begun exporting programmes before the establishment of KBS Media. Since the mid-1980s, KBS had consistently exported KBS animations and documentaries, but the profits were not significant. KBS Media eventually changed its primary export genre from animation to dramas. This study focuses on an analysis of KBS Media’s trial and error method of designing more adaptive strategies for programme exports, and examines why its trials of animation exports were not ultimately successful.

The first president of KBS Media was Chang Hansung. He was succeeded by Park Jun-young in March 1993. Both men, who had previously participated in MIPTV and other renowned international programme markets, perceived that KBS Media needed to actively take steps to enter the overseas market. Park Jun-young noted the endemic problem of KBS Media in the early 1990s:

Originally, the main work of KBS Media had been organising the import of foreign broadcasting programmes for

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**Figure 2**

The three broadcasters’ programme sales subsidiaries

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Three terrestrial stations</th>
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<tr>
<td>KBS</td>
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<tr>
<td>KBS Media</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sales subsidiary of KBS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Established in 1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBC</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBC Productions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sales subsidiary of MBC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Established in 1991, and merged with MBC in 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBS</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBS Contents Hub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales subsidiary of SBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established in 1992 as SBS Productions, and spun off into SBS Contents Hub in 2008</td>
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</table>
KBS. Consequently, KBS Media could not secure a reasonable income source and had become heavily dependent on KBS's subvention. I recognised that KBS Media needed to develop an independent, steady income source sufficient to manage a company. Thus, from 1993 onwards, I started to study how KBS Media could sell KBS programmes to the overseas market.  

By the mid 1990s, broadcast programme exports mostly meant the supply of low-cost or free-of-charge Korean television programs to overseas cable stations for Korean emigrants in the US, Japan and Russia (Lee, 1995, p. 25). Inevitably, KBS Media's expenditure heavily outweighed its income:  

Between 1993 and 1995, KBS Media tried to find a strategy that would increase its income. I decided to concentrate KBS Media's export trial on animations, and focus on exporting to neighboring Asian countries. In 1995, twenty-one cable channels opened and KBS Media expected to sell KBS programmes to the domestic market. However, almost all the cable channels preferred foreign programmes to domestic content, and KBS Media were forced to rely on overseas market sales.  

Park's hopes notwithstanding, the general prospects for programme exports were far from positive. In 1993, Korean television programme exports amounted to US$4.4 million. By contrast, programme imports in the same year were worth US$20.2 million, which greatly exceeded the value of programme exports (Lee, 1995, p. 22).  

An interview about the prospects of internationalising the broadcasting industry in the quarterly magazine *Broadcasting Research*, published in the summer of 1995, demonstrated the shallow understanding of programme exports on the part of each broadcasting station's executives in the mid 1990s. In this interview, Choi Chung-woong, head of KBS's strategy research team, suggested attempting joint production with foreign broadcasting stations for documentaries. Chang Myung-ho, the Director of MBC, pointed out that neither joint productions with foreign broadcasters nor documentary exports, as KBS preferred, would be profitable enough, although they might be helpful for state promotion. Chang stated that MBC intended to focus on the production and export of television films (Hong, 1995: 12–16).  

When asked about this in a field work interview for this study, Park Jae-bog, the former General Manager of MBC Productions, stated that MBC Productions had not considered exporting television films in the 1990s, and that Chang's interview in *Broadcasting Research* signified that MBC executives had had neither enough knowledge nor enough interest in MBC Productions' actual exports. Another noteworthy point is that Choi did not mention in this interview KBS Media's constant attempts to export animations; this implies that KBS was determined to end its investment in export-targeted animation production.  

In spite of the shallow understanding of programme exports on the part of MBC executives, their production endeavoured to enter the neighbouring overseas market with a more pro-active attitude than KBS Media. In 1991, MBC Productions succeeded in exporting the abridged version of '500 Years of the Chosun Dynasty: The Japanese Invasion' (1990) to the satellite channel of the Japanese terrestrial station NHK. In those times, KBS Media had not yet exported KBS dramas.  


The export flow of KBS Media and MBC Productions in the 1990s indicates that there was
a difference between the two companies’ perspectives on programme exports. It is clear that MBC Productions had a more positive attitude regarding its prospects on the overseas market, since it took the risk of entering the little-known Chinese broadcasting market in the early 1990s. In contrast, KBS Media seems to have made little effort to compete on the overseas market, even though they had a longer history of export experience and more knowledge of the field than MBC Production.

This difference can be explained by two primary factors: first, the strong entrepreneurial spirit of the Korean conglomerates seems to have invigorated the sales subsidiaries of MBC and SBS through the recruitment of experienced employees. According to Park Jae-bog, several key employees of both MBC Productions and SBS Productions had previously worked in the overseas sales divisions of the Korean conglomerates. In addition, since the mid 1990s, the more business-oriented ways of the conglomerates had prevailed in the broadcasting industry, through the newly opened cable channels operated by conglomerates such as Samsung, Hyundai, and LG. Media studies researcher Shim Doo-bo’s comment is worth noting:

I think that the Korean conglomerates are the big powers which had a positive and significant influence on the rapid export increase of Korean dramas. The keen export drive of the Korean conglomerates with their long history of selling Korean products to overseas was quickly transferred to the broadcasting stations’ trade subsidiaries in the early 1990s, thus allowing Korea to compete at the international level. In this context, it is likely that the Korean conglomerates’ export-oriented ambitions encouraged programme exporters to enter an unexplored market like China.

Comparing MBC Productions, most KBS Media export staff were recruited from KBS. From the time when KBS Enterprises started its first animation exports in 1987, they taught themselves the process of exporting programmes. The lack of experience on the part of KBS Media’s export staff was most likely a significant handicap, making it difficult for KBS to pursue programme exports as vigorously as MBC Productions. Second, and perhaps more importantly, KBS Media has had a tendency to perceive programme exports as a means of state promotion—as Choi Chang-woong mentioned in an interview published in Broadcasting Research in 1995. KBS Media seems to have considered animation and documentaries as primary export genres because these two genres were considered ‘sound’ and accordingly deemed suitable for state promotion to overseas audiences. It is possible that this desire to use broadcasting exports as state promotion tools may have prevented KBS Media from recognising the high potential of dramas in the overseas market until the mid 1990s.

The ambiguous stance of KBS Media towards programme exports underwent a dramatic change in 1995. According to the internal data of KBS Media, their drama and animation exports in 1995 were recorded as US$652,000 and US$270,000 respectively. Although the total volume of programme exports was still low, drama exports began to exceed animation exports. In effect, KBS Media’s export strategy shifted, focusing on drama even as KBS reduced their animation production budget in 1995.

Despite the decrease in animation exports, KBS Media’s export income did not decline. Programme exports of KBS Media exceeded US$1 million in 1996 and steadily continued to grow until it reached approximately US$3 million by 2000 (KBS, 1996, p. 780; KBS, 1998, p. 690; KBC, 2003, p. 32). Figure 3 shows that between 1995 and 2001 KBS Media’s exports tended to increase, or to stay at almost the same level as that of the previous years, regardless of the decreasing flow of animation exports.

In 1997, KBS Media exported the KBS drama ‘First Love’ (1997) and a handful of other drama
serials to Chinese and Vietnamese broadcasting stations in profitable deals. With these drama exports, KBS Media realised two important factors: first, that there was a relatively small, but steady demand for Korean dramas from Asian broadcasters (especially from cable channels in Taiwan and Hong Kong). And, second, that the export of drama serials was evidently more profitable than other genre exports. An example of this was ‘First Love’, which was composed of sixty episodes. Although the export price per episode of this drama to the Chinese broadcaster was only US$500, the total export price amounted to US$30,000. Compared to the income from drama exports, the export revenue from the documentary ‘Beautiful Mountains of the World’ (KBS, 1997), composed of five episodes, was US$5,000, with an export price of US$1,000 per episode.

In the 1990s, most Asian programme buyers either had no opportunities to watch Korean dramas or had the preconceived idea that they were merely imitations of Japanese dramas. KBS Media staff continued to participate in Asian broadcast programme markets from the mid 1990s onwards in order to promote the unique characteristics and affordable prices of Korean dramas to programme buyers from the Chinese territories. Through these trials, KBS Media seems to have realised that it did not have enough knowledge or experience to export its dramas to numerous cable channels in the Chinese territories. Consequently, instead of attempting direct exports, it made an exclusive contract with the Taiwanese agency Insrea in 1998 to supply KBS dramas at US$600 per episode for the next three years. As a result, KBS Media’s export revenue grew to US$3.4 million in 1998, which was almost double the income of the previous year (KBS, 1998, p. 784). This strategy proved an effective means of selling KBS dramas, and soon MBC Productions and SBS Productions made similar exclusive contracts with Taiwanese agencies.22

At the time, the maximum export price paid by the Taiwanese cable channels for a Japanese drama episode had increased to US$9,000. Smaller Taiwanese cable channels which could not afford to buy the high-priced Japanese dramas decided to purchase Korean dramas through local agencies at approximately US$1,200 per episode.23 Due to the price advantage and comparatively high quality of Korean dramas, more and more Taiwanese channels soon preferred to purchase Korean dramas. Thus, KBS Media succeeded in entering the Taiwanese cable channels and subsequently began exporting its dramas to Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia using the same strategy.24

In 2001, KBS Media succeeded in exporting the KBS drama ‘Autumn in My Heart’ (2000) to Japanese local and satellite broadcasting stations for the first time.25 This entry led to the appearance of KBS dramas on the Japanese terrestrial station NHK in 2003, and ‘Winter Sonata’, the first Korean drama broadcast on NHK, enjoyed huge popularity among Japanese female audiences. As mentioned above, the total revenue that KBS Media earned from exporting ‘Winter Sonata’ to Japan amounted to over US$25 million, which is the highest revenue so far earned on the overseas market by a Korean drama series.

This overview of KBS Media’s export history shows that KBS Media’s animation exports ended unsuccessfully despite focused investment over more than a decade; while, there was great success
for drama exports. The main reason that KBS Media's animation exports were not successful may well be that its export strategy was not well organised. KBS Media seems to have missed the changing flow of Asian broadcasting industries in the 1990s. KBS Media assumed that Korean animations could follow the success of Japanese animations, which had been popular internationally since the early 1960s. In fact, the Japanese animation industry appears to have had the global market in mind, deliberately creating non-Japanese characters in order to gain the advantage in exports (Henshushitsu, 1995; cited by Iwabuchi, 2002, p. 94). However, expanding cable channel industries in Taiwan and Hong Kong created new audiences who were more interested in locally relevant and regionally accessible content (Lim, 1998, p. 37). Although KBS Media focused its exports on the Asian broadcasting market, it is unlikely that it carefully examined the changing demands of Asian cable channels.

More importantly, KBS Media attempted animation exports not because Korean animations were already competitive at the international level, but because it had the essential aim of exporting domestic broadcasting content. In order to achieve this aim, KBS Media was determined to boost animation production. It is still unclear why KBS stuck to the slight possibility of programme exports, perhaps even after realising the low feasibility of animation exports. This study will now analyse KBS Media's decision to push for internationalisation during the 1990s.

The political context of KBS Media’s programme exports

When analysing the trial and error method employed by KBS Media, it is important to note that KBS endeavored to export enough domestic broadcasting content to artificially boost the production of export-oriented programmes. A key question is why KBS was initially interested in programme exports and made efforts to export its products through KBS Media. Needless to say, an economic incentive seems to have been the primary factor in these persistent export attempts, as Park Jun-young stated above. However, it is unlikely that KBS expected KBS Media to profit from export success in the 1990s. KOCCA's senior researcher, Lee Man-je, claimed in his interview that KBS most likely regarded the possibility of domestic programme export success as slim at best.

Historical and political factors may help to explain this inconsistency. To begin with, the quasi-governmental structure of KBS may have been an inhibiting factor in its attempts to export. KBS began as a state-owned broadcasting station and developed in the advantageous monopolistic situation created by the military governments. Media studies researcher Joo Chang-yun claimed that the two military governments allowed KBS to build itself into a cultural, political and ideological institution in its own right, protected by the monopolistic advantages it enjoyed throughout the 1980s. In return, KBS accepted the role of propagandist to promote the national culture, common good, morals and, above all, the rapid economic development of Korea under the autocratic leadership of the military government.

KBS started exporting animation programmes in the mid-1980s, when it was still under the direct control of the second military government. At the time, KBS executives were sensitive to the government's export-oriented policies in their business decisions. The comment of media studies researcher Cho Hang-je reveals that the specific status of KBS as a quasi-governmental organisation may have been responsible for the unprofitable export results of KBS Media:

The typical discourse undercurrent in government policies has been that Korean industry should work harder to compete in the overseas market because the domestic market is too small to make enough profits and enrich the national economy. The Korean broadcasters shared the government's view, but they did not know how to enter the overseas market.
In this context, it is highly probable that the government perspective of emphasising export success, instituted by the Park Chung-hee regime in the 1960s as a national survival strategy, played a great role in allowing KBS Media to regard programme exports as both a propaganda tool and a money-making venture.28

Nevertheless, the question of whether the government provided an opportunity for KBS Media to gain access to international markets needs to be considered carefully, since it is difficult to find concrete evidence proving that the government encouraged KBS Media's export efforts. Although Korean broadcasters' initial participation in MIPTV in 1977 was accomplished by government pressure, it is doubtful that the government had any particular interest in KBS Media's export challenges until the advent of the Kim Dae-jung regime in 1998.

It was not until the Kim Dae-jung regime (1998–2002) that the Korean government began to enthusiastically support the export efforts of the cultural industries, including those involving animations. The Plan for the Culture and Tourism Policy of the New Government, the new policy plan for the Kim Dae-jung regime’s support for the cultural industry published in December 1998, presented a blueprint for encouraging animation exports, for example through the establishment of an animation production support organisation, increasing the compulsory quota for domestic animation broadcasts in the terrestrial stations, and providing US$60 million in subsidies for animation productions (MCT, 1998, p. 92). These supports, however, only appeared after KBS Media had provisionally given up trying to export domestic animations in 1995. During the Kim Dae-jung regime, drama exports significantly exceeded animation exports. In 2001, dramas and animations accounted for 70.9 per cent and 11.9 per cent respectively of the three terrestrial stations’ exports (KOCCA, 2001, p. 11).

In this context, it is likely that the government played a certain role in helping KBS in its initial programme export efforts by virtue of the profoundly unequal relationship between the government and KBS, but this help was much less significant than might be imagined. Even after the appearance of the Kim Dae-jung regime, the government failed to gain specific knowledge or long-term expectations of programme export potential.

**Conclusion**

This case study has explored the organisation of KBS Media, the programme sales subsidiary of Korea’s largest terrestrial broadcaster, KBS, how they developed their export strategies, and how they eventually succeeded in a seemingly impossible mission: exporting domestic programmes to the Asian broadcasting market. In addition, this research has examined whether government policies have actually influenced KBS Media’s un stinting attempts to break into the overseas market.

First, the government policies seem not to have actually stimulated the international programme sales of the three terrestrial stations. Even though the autocratic Park Chung-hee regime (1961–1979) forced the three broadcasters to participate in the international programme market in the late 1970s, it is less probable that the government was interested in the potential for domestic television programme internationalisation. At the same time as the Kim Dae-jung regime (1998–2002) tried to encourage the export of domestic animations to foreign countries, KBS Media, which had consistently produced and exported domestic animations, provisionally abandoned animation exports and began to concentrate on drama exports. This untimely support given to animation exports shows that the government had not developed adequate policies regarding broadcast programme exports.

Secondly, the persistent efforts of KBS Media since the mid 1980s to break into the overseas market seem to have resulted from the top-down relationship between the Korean government and KBS, rather than from the policies of support for programme exports. With the exception of the
initial forced participation in MIPTV during the late 1970s, there was no government pressure on the broadcasting stations to export programmes. Nonetheless, after participating in the international programme market, KBS seems to have made the decision to export its products, perhaps feeling its responsibility to lead as an organisation formerly affiliated with the government.

Thirdly, KBS Media and the sales subsidiary of MBC had a marked difference in attitude towards programme exports in the early stage, but this difference has significantly diminished with the increase in drama exports. Whereas MBC Productions had a more businesslike attitude towards programme exports, KBS Media tended to use the broadcasts of domestic television programmes overseas as a means of state promotion as well as for economic gain. It is highly possible that this dual perspective encouraged KBS Media to pursue export-oriented animation productions regardless of how unprofitable these were. Owing to the increasing demand for drama exports, however, KBS Media appears to have eventually abandoned its original aim of broadcasting ‘sound’ domestic programmes on overseas channels in line with the official nationalism of the Korean government, and focused instead on maximising economic benefit through programme exports.

In sum, KBS Media has achieved success in its export of drama programmes independently rather than depending on the specific support policies of the government. In this context, the present study found that the significant success of the drama exports of KBS Media was accomplished without well-organised support policies, mainly due to the unanticipated popularity of Korean dramas in the neighbouring Chinese territories and Japan.

The key lesson to be learned from this case study is that it is not easy for the government to surmount the shortcomings of its cultural industries policies. It has been seen as a common limitation of cultural industries policies on a global scale that such policies cannot keep up with the fast-changing conditions in the creative industries. The Kim Dae-jung administration had a strong will to support the promising broadcasting content for export success. However, their nationalistic viewpoint seems to have been an impediment to realising the potential of various broadcasting programmes on the international market. Whereas the government concentrated on fostering the export of ‘sound’ animations, the trend in the international programme market increasingly demanded Korean dramas, which had been recognised by Asian viewers as competitive broadcast content.

Notes
1. In this thesis, Korea and Korean refer to South Korea and South Korean and specifically excludes North Korea and North Korean.
2. Unless otherwise noted, broadcast or broadcasting indicates only television broadcasting and excludes radio broadcasting.
3. This data was obtained from the World Bank website: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries (accessed 22 June 2012).
5. The second military government lasted for twelve years until 1992, initially under the rule of General Chun and then under his successor, General Roh Tae-woo.
6. Interview with Park In-soo, head of the programme export team at KBS Media, 28 June 2011 in Seoul, Korea.
7. Interview with Chang Han-sung, former President of KBS Media, 5 August 2010 in Seoul, Korea. Regarding the forceful intervention of KCIA in initial programme exports.
8. Colour television broadcasts were first introduced to Korea in December 1980.
9. TBC was a commercial broadcasting station under the Park regime. After the collapse of the Park regime and with the commencement of the Chun Doo-whan regime, TBC was forcibly merged with KBS.
10. Interview with Chang Han-sung, 5 August 2010. Interview with Park Jun-young, 28 July 2010. Both interviews were held in Seoul, Korea.

12. ‘Kkachi’ means magpie in Korean. In this case, Kkachi was the main character’s name.


14. KBS Media Enterprises was renamed KBS Media in November 2000.


18. According to Park In-soo, the first drama export by KBS Media was to Hong Kong cable channels in 1993.

19. Both Park Jae-bog, former General Manager of MBC Productions and Kim Young-won, General Director of SBS Contents Hub had worked in the export division of LG before moving to MBC Productions and SBS Productions respectively.


22. Interview with Song Byung-joon, an independent drama agent and President of drama production company Group Eight, 3 August 2010 in Seoul, Korea.


25. Telephone interview with Huzimoto Toshikatsu, a former NHK producer, 6 July 2011.


28. Kim Young-won, the General Director of SBS Contents Hub, demonstrated how, by the 1990s, programme exporters at the three terrestrial broadcasting stations tended to regard programme exports as potentially beneficial to both government and broadcasting stations and not merely a profitable business venture.

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Globally, the last decade has seen exponential growth in the use of mobile technologies and the Internet. From e-mail to e-governance, e-commerce to e-learning, Internet usage has changed the way the world communicates.

At the forefront of the electronic and digital revolution in Asia has been the mobile phone. Recent International Telecommunication Union (ITU) statistics indicate that in the period from 2005 to 2013, mobile (cellular) phone subscriber numbers in the Asia-Pacific region have soared from 833 million to 3,547 million users. The era of an e-Asia has dawned.

The benefits of instant, intranational and trans-border communication have impacted upon almost every aspect of life, with mobile phones and the Internet providing new pathways for inter-personal communication, business and commercial enterprise, community development, educational opportunity, governance, and democratic reform. Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are an enabling factor in supporting marginalized societies to more beneficially interact with a broader citizenry, while the convergence of computers, media, and telecommunications has created new platforms for entrepreneurship, education, and political inclusion.

However, in the Asia-Pacific region, where cultural traditions and family values are hugely respected and deeply ingrained, the influences of a new ‘e-Asia literacy’ are impacting on social conventions, etiquette, language and community structures. In a homogenized international ‘knowledge society’ where communication processes transcend national boundaries, the retention of traditional values and ways of life are increasingly challenged.

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